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INTRODUCTION
In a legal system wedded to the notion that only two mutually
exclusive sexes coexist, transsexualism' poses a daunting challenge.
Whereas judges purport to decide disputes based on principles of jus-
tice, fairness, objectivity and adherence to stare decisis, transsexualism
engenders judicial responses ranging from understanding and accep-
tance to disbelief and hostility. This Article explores the influences on
judicial reactions to transsexualism and attempts to explain why the
issues of gender incongruence posed by transsexualism are troubling
to the bench.
After a description of an analytical framework constructed of
theories drawn from the writings of Mikhail Bahktin, Roland Barthes,
and Sigmund Freud, this Article discusses the discrepancies in courts'
1. Transsexualism is defined as "[t]he desire to change one's anatomic sexual character-
istics to conform physically with one's perception of self as a member of the opposite
sex." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DicnoAY 1841 (26th ed. 1995). The condition experi-
enced is properly termed "gender dysphoria," its manifestation (i.e., adoption of the
desired sex role) "transsexualism." William A.W. Walters, Human Sexual Differentia-
ion and Its Disturbances, in SEX CHANGE: THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF SEX
REA SIGNMENT 21 (HA. Finlay ed., 1988).
"Transgendered" has emerged as an alternative to "transsexual" and refers to
"women and men whose self-described gender identity is other than their sexual
identity at birth (regardless of whether those people have had hormonal treatment or
surgery to reassign their sexual identity)." Odeana R. Neal, The Limits of Legal Dir-
course: Learning firom the Civil Rights Movement in the Quest fr Gay and Lesbian Civil
Rights, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L REv. 679, 679 n.* (1996). Transgenderism also refers to
"all those subjects who cross gender boundaries (as in 'the transgender community')
[and] (more specifically) those subjects who undergo partial sex change, usually hor-
monal." BERNice L HAUsMAN, CHANGING SEX TRANssExuAuIsM, TECHNOLOGY,
AND THE IDEA OF GENDER 228 n.85 (1995). See alro KATE BoRNsi-rN, GENDER
Ourmw ON MEN, WOMEN AND THE REST OF Us 67-68 (1994) (explaining the hi-
erarchy among transsexuals, transgenders, and transvestites); GORDENE OLCA
MAcKENZm, TRANSGENDER NATION 55-56 (1994) (explaining the relationship be-
tween "transgenderism" and "transsexualism").
As this Article addresses individuals who seek medical intervention in order to
harmonize their psychological and anatomical sexual identities, the terms
"transsexualism" and "transsexual" will be used throughout. The term "postoperative"
is used to signify one who has undergone sex conversion surgery. The acronyms MTF
(male-to-female) and FTM (female-to-male) will be used, and pronouns and refer-
ences to "female" or "male" refer to psychological sex unless otherwise made clear. In
the main, though not exclusively,- this Article examines the legal position of MTFs,
given that most of the extant case law on transsexualism involves MTFs.
[Vol. 4:275
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use of medical authority in cases considering the rights of transsexuals2
and then analyzes courts' ultimate refusal to recognize transsexuals'
psychological sex. The thrust of this Article is an examination of the
forces compelling such inconsistencies. The result is an analysis which
interweaves medical, juridical, psychological and mythic perspectives
to disclose the underpinnings of courts' antipathy toward transsexuals.
I. THE TRANssExuAL AS GROTESQUE:
A FRAmEwoRK FOR ANALYSIS
The primary factor influencing judicial emphasis on predictable
outcomes is the Western classical tradition's emphasis on rationalism
and closure.3 The representation of the body in such a classical mode,
according to Mikhail Bakhtin, is:
entirely finished, completed, strictly limited .... [It] does not
merge with other bodies and with the world. All attributes of
the unfinished world are carefully removed, as well as all the
signs of its inner life. The verbal norms of official and literary
language, determined by the canon, prohibit all that is linked
with fecundation, pregnancy, childbirth.!
In the classical mode, organs of the body:
acquire an exclusiveness; in other words, they convey a merely
individual meaning of the life of one single, limited body....
[N]o signs of duality have been left.... The severance of the
2. "A transsexual believes that he is the victim of a biologic accident, cruelly imprisoned
within a body incompatible with his real sexual identity. Most are men who consider
themselves to have feminine gender identity and regard their genitalia and masculine
features with repugnance. Their primary objective in seeking psychiatric help is not
to obtain psychologic treatment but to secure surgery that will give them as dose an
approximation as possible to a female body. The diagnosis is made only if the distur-
bance has been continuous (not limited to periods of stress) for at least 2 years, is not
symptomatic of another mental disorder such a schizophrenia, and is not associated
with genital ambiguity or genetic abnormality." THE MERCK MUMA. op DIAGNOSIS
AND THERAPY 1434 (Robert Berkow ed., 14th ed. 1982).
3. See ROLAND BARnEs, S/Z 7 (Richard Miller trans., 1974) (noting that a discursive
focus on truth, objectivity and law is grounded in a "return to the closure of Western
discourse"); Paul Brest, The Thirty-First Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture Constitu-
tional Citizenship, 34 CLv. ST. L. Rv. 175, 192 (1986) (noting American
constitutional laws deep-rootedness in the post-Enlightenment tradition of rational-
istic ethics).
4. MIKA-tL BAxrrKN, RABELAIs AND His Wou, D320 (Helene Iswolsky trans., 1968).
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organs from the body or their independent existence is no
longer permitted.
That which protrudes, bulges, sprouts, or branches off (when
a body transgresses its limits and a new one begins) is elimi-
nated, hidden, or moderated.5
The classical notion of the body, Bakhtin has commented, conflicts
with the grotesque image of the body prevalent in antique and medie-
val literature, a literature punctuated with carnivalesque images of
death, renewal, and fertility. In such works, the body is always in the
act of becoming:
It is never finished, never completed; it is continually built,
created, and builds and creates another body... [It] ignores
the impenetrable surface that closes and limits the body as a
separate and completed phenomenon.... [and] constructs [an
existence in which] the life of one body is born from the death
of the preceding, older one.... A tendency toward duality can
be glimpsed everywhere.6
In the course of his commentary, Bakhtin criticizes literary
scholar G. Schneegans for deeming the grotesque in literature merely
"a negation, an exaggeration pursuing narrowly satirical aims. '
Schneegans "did not see that, in the grotesque world of becoming, the
limits between objects and phenomena are drawn quite differently
than in the static world of art and literature of his time."' Schneegans'
response to the grotesque in literature is similar to that of jurists em-
ploying classical models of interpretation to address the phenomenon
of transsexuality. The law, ever at the ready with its categories and
distinctions, is prepared to recognize only two sexes, male and female,
and rejects and finds jocular a body "in the act of becoming." Bifur-
cating sex into the exclusive categories male and female, the law rejects
recognition of any different sex, of any state of intersex, or of a sexual
continuum that would call into question the legal system's insistence
on mutually exclusive sexual categories. The law is unprepared to
5. BAxwrn', supra note 4, at 320-22.
6. BKmIrrN, supra note 4, at 317-18, 323.
7. BxxrrN, supra note 4, at 304.
8. BAMxTlN, supra note 4, at 308.
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encompass the blurring of these categories in the phenomenon of
transsexualism and reacts to maintain them.9
For the courts the grotesque image of the transsexual threatens an
unhinging of a paradigmatic sexual order and a defiance of closure
and certainty in the realm of sexual identity. If the courts were to try
to place an individual whose characteristics did not indicate one sex or
the other sex into the mainstream of society, the result would be a
fundamental challenge to the meaning of sex itself. Without exclusion
on some level from participation in society, transsexuals would
threaten a subversion of the categories upon which the law of sexual
identity rests;'0 the binary categories male and female, mutually exclu-
sive in law, would be called into question.
Roland Barthes' SIZ, a post-structuralist unraveling of Honor6 de
Balzac's Sarrasine, describes what happens to meaning and intended
closure when a binary classification essential to a given paradigm no
longer holds:
the physical contact between these two completely separate
substances ... produces a catastrophe: there is an explosive
shock,... the depths are emptied, as in vomiting. This is what
happens when the arcana of meaning are subverted, when the
sacred separation of the paradigmatic poles is abolished, when
one removes the separating barrier... the excess explodes."
Disapproval of challenging a fixed social order is not the only
element present in the courts' stance with respect to transsexualism.
There is also the presence of judicial horror at the thought of castra-
tion and of the implantation of the image of a female father into
social consciousness. While on the surface juridical discourse seeks to
9. Kenji Yoshino sees the basis of the binary system of sex dassification as follows: "A
corollary of the axiom of 'one body, one person' appears to be 'one body, one sex.'
The social interest in this corollary reveals itself in the vehemence with which sexual
deviance is defined and regulated by it." Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary
A rgument for Heightened Scrutinyfor Gays, 96 CoLum. L REv. 1753, 1829 (1996).
10. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1966), in which the trial court described
miscegenation as a subversion of God's plan:
'Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and
he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with
his arrangement there would be no cause for [interracial] marriages. The
fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to
Ink)
11. BRTHas, supra note 3, at 65-66. See also Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408,
417 (7th Cir. 1987) (remarking that housing the transsexual inmate "in a general
population cell would undoubtedly create... 'a volatile and explosive situation.' ").
1997]
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categorize transsexualism as play, and those who indulge in it as so-
cietal dropouts, at a deeper level the court objectifies the transsexual as
a disruption of a fixed social order through her willful alteration of her
body,'2 and thus sees her as deserving of social censure."
Transsexualism, invested with this explosive threat of abolishing
the binary separation of the sexes, is in this sense a discursive inter-
loper, threatening, with its definitive mutability, the jurisprudential
paradigm upon which questions of sexual identity have been based.
Courts are in the position of repelling this subversive force and do so,
employing discourse replete with overdetermined references to the
frivolousness of transsexuality and a subliminal judicial preoccupation
with castration, and deploying into the social consciousness the image
of a female father. It is at this level that the juridical discourse, facially
one of containment, is in fact nascent, invested with its own explosive
potential.
II. MEDICAL AUTHOITY
One of the salient characteristics of judicial opinions considering
transsexualism is their inclusion of medical authority. Courts defer to
medical evidence in some cases, while in others they merely refer to it,
basing the outcome of such cases on what best promotes societal equi-
librium. This selective use of medical authority occurs in cases ranging
from the availability of medical assistance for indigent transsexuals, to
cases involving the ability of transsexuals to marry, the rights of trans-
sexual prisoners, and the status of transsexuals under federal, state, and
local anti-discrimination laws.
12. See 1-AusmAN, supra note 1, at 192 ("[T]he idea of gender identity disrupts the bi-
nary opposition understood as given in nature. As the body can be made to signify in
opposition to its original designation as male or female, the dinical opinion that an
individual has a cross-sex core gender identity usually signifies a decision to go ahead
with surgical and hormonal treatments to effect sex change. In this scenario, the bi-
nary opposition between the sexes turns on the determination of gender; that is,
sexual difference is undone by the idea of identity.") (footnote omitted).
13. See JUDrrH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMdINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDEN-
rrY 16-17, 151 n.6 (1990) [hereinafter GENDER TRouBIE] (arguing that the
discourse of gender, taking for its premise "that for bodies to cohere and make sense
there must be a stable sex expressed through a stable gender," hegemonically regulates
to produce subjects who fit its requirements for "harmony" between sex, gender, and
sexuality and punishes those for whom the categories are in disarray).
[Vol. 4:275
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Courts have no trouble finding sex reassignment surgery 4 medi-
cally necessary"' for the treatment of gender dysphoria due to the
medical consensus that surgery is the most promising route toward
alleviating the suffering of transsexuals.' 6 Courts have more difficulty,
however, when the sexual identity of transsexuals, both pre- and post-
surgery, is an issue. Resorting to medical authority, the courts are
faced with the lack of a medical consensus regarding the sexual iden-
tity of the transsexual.' 7 There is, however, unanimity of opinion in
the medical community that sex exists along a continuum, that male
14. At least one commentator has suggested such procedures be deemed "'"sex-
confirmation" operations.' "See J. Joris Hage, Medical Requirements and Consequences
ofSex Reassignment Surgery, in TRANSSEXUALISM, MEDICINE AND LAW, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE XXIIIRD COLLOQUY ON EUROPEAN LAw [hereinafter T.ANssEXUALnsM] 103,
104 (1995).
15. See infra notes 24-37, and accompanying text. Note, though, that "transsexualism"
has disappeared from the American Psychiatric Association's list of mental disorders
and may no longer be considered a mental disorder. Compare AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 74,
463 (3d ed. rev. 1987) (defining transsexualism as a mental disorder) with AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DIs-
ORDERS 532 (4th ed. 1994) (excluding any mention of transsexualism from category
of "Gender Identity Disorders").
16. See Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 271 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
("Medical Science has not found any organic cause or cure (other than sex reassign-
ment surgery and hormone therapy) for transsexualism, nor has psychotherapy been
successful in altering the transsexual's identification with the other sex or his desire
for surgical change."); Richard Green, Spelling "Relief'for Transsexuals: Employment
Discrimination and the Criteria of Sex, 4 YALE L & POL'Y Ray. 125, 125 (1985)
("This compulsion to change anatomic sex is not modifiable by psychiatric interven-
tion."); Notes and Comments, Transsexuals in Limbo: The Search for a Legal
Definition ofSex, 31 MD. L R v. 236, 239 (1971) ("The transsexual is usually not
responsive to any form of psychotherapy and requires surgery for social adjustment.").
17. See Erwin K. Koranyi, Transsexuality Revisited, 16 AUsTRL J. oF FoRENSIC ScL 34,
37 (1983) ("Sex of a person-a simple 'yes' or 'no' before-was broken down by Sci-
ence to chromosomal sex, nuclear sex, hormonal sex, gonadal'sex, and gender sex-to
the dismay of courts, finding scientists in argument over as 'simple' a question as
whether the subject is male or female."). But see Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626
N.Y.S.2d 391, 395-96 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (determining, given "overwhelming medical
evidence," that transsexuals become their psychological sex once sex reassignment is
complete).
18. See BODY GUARDS: THE CULTURAL PoLrnCs OF GENDER AMBIGUITY 20 (Julia Ep-
stein & Kristina Straub eds., 1991) [hereinafter BODY GUARDS] ("The notion of a
'natural' continuum along which sexual differentiation subtly occurs derives... from
the earliest biomedical explanations in Western discourse."); Henry Finlay, Legal Rec-
ognition of Transsexuals in Australia, 12 J. CoNTEmp. HEALTH L & PoL'y 503, 517
(1996) ("It appears that the simplistic biblical dichotomy between the sexes may
now, in the light of modem insights, have to give way to a bipolar model of human
sexuality. Along the continuum linking the two archetypal extremes are the various
1997]
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and female are not the sole and mItitually exclusive categories, 9 and
that determination of sexual identity requires consideration of several
factors."0 The medical community has appealed to law-making bodies
to recognize this phenomenon.2' The courts, though, have not based
decisions regarding the sexual identity of transsexuals on the medical
paradigm of the sexual continuum; instead, the courts tend to base
such decisions on factors other than medical authority.22
The fact that there is medical consensus that sex reassignment
surgery' is necessary for the treatment of the gender dysphoric makes
intermediate 'abnormalities' that diverge, in greater or lesser degree, from the
norm."); Stefano Rodoti, General Presentation of Problems Related to Transsexuallism,
in TRANssExUAISM, supra note 14, at 17, 19; William A.W. Walters, Transsexual-
in-Medical and Legal Aspect, 16 AusR. J. OF FORENSIC Sc. 65, 65 (1983)
("mhe concept has developed of a spectrum of sexuality ranging from extreme mas-
culinity on one hand to extreme femininity on the other."). The view of a sexual
continuum has also been advanced for the purpose of challenging the political impli-
cations of adopting contestable identity categories. Cf URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL
EQuALrry: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND LESBIAN LIBERATION 289 (1995)
(arguing that the conception of sexual identity as categorically organized and fixed
frustrates "the homosexual potential in all people"). See also MARTINE RoTInLATr,
THE APARTHEID OF Smx A MAmFmo ON THE FREEDOM OF GENDER 103 (1995)
(using the view of a sexual continuum for the purpose of providing "equal, nondis-
criminatory opportunity for personal fulllment to all persons").
19. See supra note 17.
20. See Walters, supra note 18, at 69 ("Seven variables are thought to be involved in de-
termination of sexual identity, viz., chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, hormonal
function, internal genital morphology, external genital morphology, assigned sex
(rearing) and psychosexual differentiation.").
21. See Finlay, supra note 18, at 517 ('It is the task of the legislature to adjust the re-
ceived view of humanity accordingly and to integrate all forms of sexuality into
society as legitimate members.").
22. See Section III, infia.
23. Genital surgical sex reassignment involves the following: in male-to-female transsexu-
als, breast augmentation and resection of both testes followed by vaginoplasty in
which the erectile tissues of the penis are excised and the urethra is shortened. The
penile skin tube is turned outside-in and brought in to the neovaginal cavity resulting
in a skin-lined vaginal cul-de-sac. If the penile skin is unusable, transplantation of a
section of the colon or a free split-skin graft is considered. The scrotal skin is then
used for the construction of the labia and a clitoris is formed from a graft from the tip
of the penis affixed over the shortened penle dorsal nerves. These alterations can be
accomplished in one operation. For female-to-male transsexuals, two operations may
be required. The first of these usually involves mastectomy and can be combined
with the resection of the uterus and ovaries. The second operation focuses on con-
struction of a penis, an as yet unperfected technique, and on giving the labial region a
scrotum-like appearance via the use of testicular prostheses. See generally Edward S.
David, The Law and Transsexualism: A Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7
CONN. L. REv. 288, 293 (1974-75); Hage, supra note 14, at 105-09. For personal
accounts of the physical odyssey of sex reassignment, see BORNSTEIN, supra note 1, at
[VCol. 4:275
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cases requiring determination of whether transsexual surgery is medi-
cally necessary for the treatment of transsexualism "easy" cases for the
courts. Courts dealing with the coverage of sex reassignment surgery
under health insurance policies and the availability of public medical
assistance for the sex reassignment surgeries of indigent transsexuals
must make such a determination in the first instance. G.B. v. Lackner24
and its companion case J.D. v. Lackner25 presented indigent transsexu-
als who had applied for Medi-Ca12 benefits in order to pay for sex
reassignment surgery. In response to the state's claim that the surgery
was merely cosmetic, the G.B. court, in ruling that the plaintiffs were
entitled to the benefits, stated, "Surely, castration and penectomy
cannot be considered surgical procedures to alter the texture and con-
figuration of the skin and the skin's relationship with contiguous
structures of the body. Male genitals have to be considered more than
just skin, one would think." 7
A similar outcome obtained in Doe v. State, Department of Public
Wefare.' There the court found the Department of Public Welfare's
summary denial of medical assistance benefits for transsexual surgery
void, because it conflicted with the federal statute with which Minne-
sota was required to comply in exchange for receiving federal funds
for its medical assistance program.29 The court determined, after a re-
view of authoritative literature in the field of transsexualism, that:
it is not unreasonable to conclude that transsexualism is a very
complex medical and psychological problem which is gener-
ally developed by individuals early in life. By the time an
individual reaches adulthood, the problem of gender role diso-
rientation and the transsexual condition resulting therefrom
16-19; CARoUNE CossEY, My STORY, 35, 50-51, 95-103, 107 (1991); NANCY
HUNT, MIRROR IMAGE: THE ODYSSEY OF A MALE-To--FEMALE TRAss"xuAL 140-
144, 179, 203-04 (1978); CHRISTINE JORGENSEN, CHRISTINE JORGENSEN: A PER-
SONAL AuTOBIOGRAPHY 106, 111-114, 117, 133-137 (1967); JAN MoRius,
CONUNDRUM 105-09, 139-41 (1974); RENft RcHARWS, SECOND SERVE 166-75,
176-78, 205-08, 211-13, 264-65, 268, 272, 275-89 (1983).
24. G.B. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
25. J.D. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
26. Medi-Cal is California's Medicaid program. See Intercommunity Med. Ctr. v. BeIshe,
39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 43, 45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
27. G.B., 145 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
28. Doe v. State, Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977).
29. See Doe, 257 N.W.2d at 820.
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are so severe that the only successful treatment known to
medical science is sex conversion surgery.30
The case of Pinneke v. Preissert' contained an even stronger asser-
tion that surgery is medically necessary for the treatment of
transsexualism. In that case the court overrode the Iowa Department
of Social Services' determination that "sex reassignment surgery can
never be medically necessary when the surgery is a treatment for trans-
sexualism and removes healthy, undamaged organs and tissue." The
Eighth Circuit concluded that "[t]his approach reflects inadequate
solicitude for the applicant's diagnosed condition, the treatment pre-
scribed by the applicant's physicians, and the accumulated knowledge
of the medical community.""
Private insurers have also been required to underwrite transsexual
surgery. In Davidson v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co.," the
court declined to interfere with the professional judgment of medical
experts and ruled that sex reassignment surgery is not merely cosmetic
in nature." The Davidson court, echoing the tenor of the Doe, G.B.,
and Pinneke opinions, noted that sex reassignment surgery, which "is
requested rarely and done even more infrequently," "is lengthy, re-
quires extensive modification ... of the human body," and "is
performed to correct a psychological defect, and not to improve mus-
cle tone or physical appearance.,W6
In the area of medical necessity, at least, courts recognize the
unique issues of transsexuals and reach outcomes of a surprisingly
humanitarian character.37
30. Doe, 257 N.W.2d at 819.
31. Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980).
32. Pinneke, 623 F.2d at 549.
33. Pinneke, 623 F.2d at 549.
34. Davidson v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 420 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct.
1979).
35. See id at 453.
36. Davidson, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 452-53.
37. Not all courts have reached this conclusion. The courts in Denise A v. Lavine, 347
N.E.2d 893 (N.Y. 1976), revk 364 N.Y.S. 2d 557 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) and Rush
v. Johnson, 565 F. Supp. 856 (N.D. Ga. 1983), for example, denied benefits for
transsexual surgery. Given the more recent precedent against this conclusion and the
fact that the outcome in Rush relied on the characterization of sex reassignment as
"experimental," a similar case would likely reach the opposite outcome.
One commentator's explanation of the state's facilitation of transsexuals' treat-
ment is that the state "is so relieved to comprehend transsexuality as a gender illness
with a cure." See Note, Patriarchy is Such a Drag: The Strategic Possibilities of a Post-




As explained above, in the cases considering the necessity of
transsexual surgery, courts adopt the consensus of the medical com-
munity that sex conversion surgery is necessary to bring a transsexual
individual's psychological and anatomical sexes into congruence. Rec-
ognition of this congruence, or of the psychological sex of
preoperative transsexuals, does not always follow; transsexuals' rights
cases in the areas of family law, prisoners' rights, and employment
discrimination make this clear. The different outcomes in these cases
are not contradictory, especially in light of the lack of unanimity of
the medical profession in regard to the preoperative or the postopera-
tive transsexual's sexual identity, 8 and because medical necessity
focuses on achieving integration within individuals, while social par-
ticipation focuses on the integration of individuals with the larger
world. In addressing this question in the context of transsexuals,
courts ignore medical debate and simply deny recognition of trans-
sexuals' psychological sexual identities, even post-surgery.
A. Marriage
In general, a postoperative transsexual may not marry a person of
the opposite anatomical but same chromosomal sex. 39 If a postopera-
tive transsexual marries someone of the same anatomical but opposite
Patriarchy]. The point is weak, as it does not take into account either the failure of
the state to facilitate treatment in prisoners' rights cases, see infra notes 130-176, and
accompanying text, or the cases in which the courts systematically deny recognition
of transsexuals' psychological sex.
38. At least one practitioner, a federal prosecutor, has advocated criminal penalties, given
the "public interest in the sexual identity and physical integrity of citizens," for sur-
geons who perform transsexual surgery. See Stan Twardy, Medicoegal Aspects of
Transsexualism, MEDICAL TRLAL TECHNIQUE Q. 249, 305 (Winter 1980) ("In the
author's opinion .... surgeons, performing sex change operations, could be prose-
cuted under existing statutes of mayhem, simple and aggravated battery, criminal
negligence, murder, conspiracy, suicide (where it is still a crime), and some other
laws."). The author explains that the "castration" occurring in transsexual surgeries
could be criminalized as assault and battery or mayhem and that "it would be no de-
fense to the physician's crime of removing a healthy organ to say that the patient
consented.... [C]onsent to an illegal act is invalid." Twardy, supra at 297-299.
39. See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Probate Ct. 1987) ("iThere is no
authority in Ohio for the issuance of a marriage license to consummate a marriage
between a post-operative male to female transsexual person and a male person.").
1997]
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chromosomal sex, the marriage is voidable on the basis that it cannot
be consummated. 0 This result is startlingly different from the cases of
medical necessity where courts have so humanely found transsexuals
to be in a state of incongruence before surgical intervention. Post-
surgery, when congruent as individuals, transsexuals are nonetheless,
in the eyes of the law, incongruent with society, with the result that
their fundamental right to marry is denied.'
In Corbett v. Corbett,2 the la'ndmark English case influencing the
law relating to transsexuals, an MTF postoperative sought to avoid a
declaration that her marriage to a man was void. The court concluded
that the marriage was a nullity, since the transsexual was not in fact a
female.4 A plethora of medical authority assisted the judge, himself a
former Medical practitioner, in making the determination that, since
the transsexual's chromosomal, gonadal, and genital makeup was
characteristically male, the plaintiff was male for the purposes of the
45law of marriage.
In a curious departure from the cases involving medical necessity,
the Corbett court's stance was that sexual congruence or order existed
before surgical intervention, since the plaintiffs chromosomes, gonads,
and genitalia were all characteristically finale, and that disorder existed
after. The plaintiff's chromosomes and gonads were deemed those of a
normal male;46 only the genitalia had been altered. The court, by
privileging three of the seven determinants of sexual identity, deter-
mined that the MTF postoperative, who possessed "male"
chromosomes, was still male.47 What Corbett said, in very elementary
40. See M.T. v. J.T., 355-A.2d 204, 206, 207, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
(suggesting that validity of marriage depends on parties' possession of sex organs ade-
quate for heterosexual sexual intercourse).
41. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., -.U.S. __, ._., 117 S. Ct. 555, 564 (1996) ("Choices about
marriage, fmily life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights
this Court has ranked as 'of basic importance in our society,' rights sheltered by the
Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or dis-
respect.") (citation omitted).
42. Corbettv. Corbett, 2W.LR. 1306 (P. 1970).
43. See Corbett, 2 W.LR. at 1325, 1327, 1328.
44. See Sir Roger Ormrod, TMEs (London), January 9, 1992, at 14.
45. See Corbett, 2 W.LR. at 1325.
46. But see Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 271 (Sup. Ct.
1977) (MTF's gonadal structure post-surgery deemed by experts testifying on her be-
half to be that of ovariectomized female).
47. But see Finlay, supra note 18, at 510 ("[C]hromosomes are of no direct significance in
the formation of a person's character or in their interaction with others. The ordinary
person cannot see them, smell them, or feel them. Why then should they have an
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terms, was that a man could not become a woman as the result of sur-
gical intervention.
As seen above, in Corbett, the court invoked the binary system of
sex classification and denied April Ashley the classification which
would have reflected the congruence between her psychological and
her anatomical sex. A static rubric for the classification of sex, such as
that imposed by the Corbett court, is consistent with and ultimately
aids the driving objective of the legal system, predictable outcomes. In
this way the court invoked a sexual order based on a static rubric of
chromosomal typing and rejected the disorder posed by the MTF
postoperative, because her claimed sex could not be encompassed by
that typing.
An attempt to harmonize the cases of medical necessity and the
denial of social participation in Corbett requires one to realize that the
questions being asked in them are distinct: to ask whether surgical in-
tervention is necessary in the treatment of transsexuals is not the same
as asking whether, via surgery, a transsexual male can become female.
This realization only takes one part of the way, however. To deem
transsexual surgery medically necessary, and thus place no legal im-
pediment in the way of procuring it, while simultaneously denying
legal recognition of the "new" sex which results from it is as inhumane
as would be denying all treatment whatsoever to gender dysphorics.
One concludes, perhaps not as a matter of pure logic, but certainly as
a matter of intuition, that the legal determination that transsexual sur-
gery is medically necessary should likewise lead to the legal
recognition of the postoperative's "new') sex. The reason behind this
discrepancy in the decisions lies in the courts' reliance on medical
authority in this area. Medical authority regarding the necessity of
transsexual surgery offers a consensus. Regarding the identity of the
postoperative transsexual, however, it does not. In short, post-surgery,
overriding role in determining the sex in which a person is seen by society?"); Rodoth,
supra note 18, at 20 ("[Elven genetic sex is not dear-cut and certain.... [C]ertainties
which used to provide a point of reference by which to affirm the inalienability of
personal status are no longer valid.... [Niowadays this assumption, this legal fiction,
can no longer be viewed with the same certainty as in the past."); Bonnie B. Spanier,
"Lessons" from "Nature" Gender Ideology and Saxual Ambiguity in Biology, in BODY
GuARDs, supra note 18, at 329, 344 (finding evidence of societal biases against sexual
ambiguity in discourse related to cellular and subcellular biology); Walters, supra note
1, at 8 ("[N]ew discoveries point to the fallacy in concluding that the presence of a Y
chromosome as a distinct entity seen on conventional chromosome analysis is essen-
tial for the diagnosis of maleness.").
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some doctors advocate for legal recognition of the postoperative sex,
others for the primacy of chromosomes.
Judge Roger Ormrod, author of the opinion in Corbett, believed
in the primacy of chromosomes. In his article, The Medico-Legal As-
pects of Sex Determination,8 delivered at a meeting of the Medico-
Legal Society of London in 1972, Ormrod contrasts medical and legal
approaches to sex determination. In the medical field, admits Orm-
rod, "the categories male and female are not mutually exclusive,")A a
concept difficult for the law, with its emphasis on a binary system of
sex classification, to accept.50 Ormrod uses a discussion of the indicia
of sexual identity to prove that transsexuals can never be their psy-
chological sex but only "imitations of the other;" "they remain,
unhappily for themselves, what they" always were-psychologically
abnormal males or psychologically abnormal females.""' This tragic
outcome is primarily due, according to Ormrod, to the fact that a
transsexual's sex is not chromosomally ambiguous. Surgical interven-
tion in these cases is only part of a recommendation of a particular
mode of living, 52 not a "reassignment" at all.
Ormrod's argument, however, relies on two assumptions: first,
that medical authorities are prepared to say that a given combination
of chromosomal, genital and gonadal characteristics determines sex
(some medical authorities consider psychological factors as well);" and
48. Roger Ormrod, The Medico-LegalAspects of Sex Determination, 40 MEDIco-LEGAL J.
78 (1972).
49. Ormrod, supra note 48, at 78.
50. See In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 837 (Civ. Ct. 968) ("It has been suggested
that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a 'no-man's land' for those indi-
viduals who are neither truly 'male' nor truly 'female.' Yet the standard is much too
fixed for such far-out theories.").
51. Ormrod, supra note 48, at 82, 83. Such a view was not unique to the medical com-
munity of England. A New York Academy of Medicine committee formed to study
the issue of changing sex designations on birth certificates for postoperative transsexu-
als concluded that MTFs were "'still chromosomally males while ostensibly
females'" and that it was "'questionable whether laws and records such as the birth
certificate should be changed and thereby used as a means to help psychologically ill
persons in their social adaptation.' "Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
52. See Corbett, 2 W.LR. at 1319 ("'[W]e [doctors] do not determine sex-in medicine
we determine the sex in which it is best for the individual to live.' ") (quoting expert
testimony of Professor Dewhurst, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Queen
Charlotte's Hospital).
53. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1083 n.6 (7th Cir. 1984);




second, that if medicine were to adopt a specific rubric for determin-
ing sex, the law should likewise adopt that rubric. Ormrod trivializes
both issues by claiming that the law is indifferent to sex: "The only
branch of the law ... in which problems of sex-determination may
arise in practice is family law and in this branch it will only arise
where the validity of a marriage is in issue.
" 5
Marriage, though, is not the only legal context in which a deter-
mination of sexual identity is critical. Ormrod obviously did not
foresee Regina v. Tan,55 an English criminal case in which the defen-
dant was charged with living off the earnings of prostitution. The
criminal statute required that the defendant in such a case be male.56
The Court of Appeals held that the same rules of law as were laid
down in Corbett applied to English criminal law, and thus the defen-
dant, though having undergone sex reassignment surgery and
hormonal treatment, was male for the purposes of the statute. One
of the policy reasons behind this decision was "the desirability of cer-
tainty and consistency" in law:
It would, in our view, create an unacceptable situation if the
law were such that a marriage between Gloria Greaves and an-
other man was a nullity, on the ground that Gloria Greaves
was a man; that buggery to which she consented with such
other person was not an offence for the same reason; but that
Gloria Greaves could live on the earnings of a female prosti-
tute without offending against [the act] because for that
58purpose he/she was not a man ....
54. Ormrod, supra note 48, at 85.
55. Reginav. Tan, 1 Q.B. 1053 (1983).
56. Se Sexual Offences Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 69, § 30.
57. See Tan, 1 Q.B. at 1064.
58. Tan, 1 Q.B. at 1064. Of course the true horror of the case is what it spelled for a case
involving the rape of a postoperative MTF. In such a case, the MTF could be raped,
but since she is male in the opinion of the courts, the offense would be mere assault
or sodomy, not rape, because under English law prior to 1994 only females could be
victims of rape. The following commentary anticipated Tan: "'Male adulterers
should be heartened by the fact that they may indulge in cunnilingus, copula crure,
per oram, per anum and even per vaginum-perenially ad nauseam and with impu-
nity. It is open season on transsexuals ....' C. Nelson et al., Medicolegal Aspects of
Transsexualism, 21 CANADN PSYCHIATRmC Ass'N J. 557, 561 (1976) (quoting Ter-
rence Walton, Trans-sexualism: When is a Woman not a Woman?, 124 NEw LJ. 501,
502 (1974)). The English law has since been amended. See Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act, 1994, ch. 33 § 142 (Eng.) (amending Sexual Offences Act, 1956,
ch. 69, § 1).
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An Australian court, on the other hand, reached the opposite
conclusion in Regina v. Harris and McGuiness," a case dealing with
two MTFs, one pre- and one postoperative, who had both been con-
victed of being male persons attempting to procure other males to
commit acts of indecency.6' Both convictions were based on a finding
that the accused were men according to the test of sexual identity laid
down in Corbett.6 But on appeal, the court turned away from Corbett
and held that, for the purposes of the criminal law, in contrast to a
transsexual who had not yet undergone sex reassignment surgery, a
transsexual who had undergone sex reassignment surgery should be
treated as a member of his or her reassigned sex.62 The court followed
the New Jersey family law case MT. v. J. T.63 and made the following
conclusion:
[iT]he criminal law is concerned with the regulation of behav-
iour. It is the relevant circumstances at the time of the
behaviour to which we must have regard. And I cannot see
that the state of a person's chromosomes can or should be a
relevant circumstance in the determination of his or her
criminal liability. It is equally unrealistic, in my view, to treat
as relevant the fact that the person has acquired his or her ex-
ternal attributes as a result of operative procedure. After all,
sexual offences-with which we are particularly concerned
here-frequently involve the use of the external genitalia. How
can the law sensibly ignore the state of those genitalia at the
time of the alleged offence, simply because they were artifi-
cially created or were not the same as at birth?"6
In M.T., an MTF brought an action for maintenance against her
husband. The husband interposed the defense that M.T. was also a
male and that the marriage was thus void. The court, with the aid of
expert testimony, made a novel ruling that M.T. was in fact female for
the purposes of marriage, since she was able to function sexually as a
female, saying, "In this case the transsexual's gender and genitalia are
59. Reginav. Harris and McGuiness, (1988) 17 N.S.W.LtL 158.
60. See Harris, 17 N.S.W.Lt. at 162 (Carruthers, J.).
61. See Harris, 17N.S.W.LR. at 171 (Carruthers, J.).
62. The New South Wales District of the Federal Court of Australia maintained this
distinction in Secretary, Department of Social Security v. "SRA -, No. NG745 of 1992,
FED No. 869/93 (Dec. 1, 1993), holding that a preoperative MTF was not entitled
to receive the "wife's pension" of her invalid pensioner partner.
63. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
64. Harris, 17 N.S.W.L.R. at 192 (Mathews, J.).
[Vol. 4:275
TRANSSEXUALISM
no longer discordant; they have been harmonized through medical
treatment. Plaintiff has become physically and psychologically unified
and fully capable of sexual activity consistent with her reconciled sex-
ual attributes of gender and anatomy. ' 65 Though the opinion is
couched in very humanitarian language, the emphasis on sexual func-
tion" is unfortunate, albeit consistent with Corbett and New Jersey
law, since the inability to function sexually renders a marriage void-
able.67 The ruling thus leaves one with the question of how the case
affects the validity of FTMs' marriages, since, even with advances in
technology, many postoperative FTMs are incapable of achieving an
erection suitable for vaginal penetration. The case is also an anomaly69
among American jurisdictions which, if the reported cases illustrate
the trend, by and large do not follow M. T.70 The humanitarian
65. M.T,355A.2dat2ll.
66. The M. Tcourt said:
[I]t is the sexual capacity of the individual which must be scrutinized. Sex-
ual capacity or sexuality in this frame of reference requires the coalescence
of both the physical ability and the. psychological and emotional orienta-
tion to engage in sexual intercourse as either a male or a female.... If such
sex reassignment surgery is successful and the postoperative transsexual is,
by virtue of medical treatment, thereby possessed of the full capacity to
function sexually as a male or female, as the case may be, we perceive no
legal barrier, cognizable social taboo, or reason grounded in public policy
to prevent that person's identification at least for purposes of marriage to
the sex finally indicated."
M. T, 355 A.2d at 209-11.
67. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-1 (West 1987). This law states:
Judgments of nullity of marriage may be rendered in all cases, when:
c. The parties, or either of them, were at the time of marriage physically
and incurably impotent, provided the party making the application shall
have been ignorant of such impotency or incapability at the time of the
marriage, and has not subsequently ratified the marriage.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A.34-1 (West 1987).
68. See Hage, supra note 14, at 106-07.
69. The author of Patriarchy employs MT., calling it the leading case on transsexual
marriage, as support for the point that the state affords transsexuals benefits that it
denies to gays and lesbians because transsexuals can be "read as reinforcing rather
than subverting the boundary between masculinity and femininity." Pariarchy, supra
note 37, at 1993. The point is weak, given MT.'s unrepresentativeness and the
plethora of cases suggesting that transsexuals, even if postoperative, cannot attain state
recognition of their psychological sex.
70. See, e.g., In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1987) (court denying an
application for marriage of postoperative MTF to a male). Unless courts take posi-
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language7 used by the court is also absent from other court opinions
on this subject.
Frances B. v. Mark B., illustrates the fate of the preoperative
transsexual in the context of marriage." In that case the plaintiff filed
a motion to have her marriage to an FTM preoperative-who had
nonetheless submitted to a mastectomy and a hysterectomy -a nul-
lity. Instead of focusing on the defendant's sexual identity, the court
focused on his ability to function sexually and procreatively as a male:
Assuming, as urged, that defendant was a male entrapped in
the body of a female, the record does not show that the en-
trapped male successfully escaped to enable defendant to
perform male functions in a marriage.... While it is possible
that defendant may function as a male in other situations and
in other relationships, defendant cannot function as a husband
by assuming male duties and obligations inherent in the mar-
riage relationship.... Apparently, hormone treatments and
surgery have not succeeded in supplying the necessary appa-
ratus to enable defendant to function as a man for purposes of
procreation. 7'
On this basis, the court granted the plaintiffs motion to declare her
marriage a nullity.
74
The emphasis on sexual function in these cases reveals that only
preoperative anatomically male or female transsexuals can marry per-
sons of the opposite anatomical sex. Of anatomical males, it is
possible that only those who have not yet begun the process of sex re-
assignment can marry, since estrogen can render male genitals ill-
suited for intercourse. The result for postoperatives is not so auspi-
cious. They cannot marry at all. On the one hand they cannot marry
persons of the same chromosomal though opposite anatomical sex,
dons similar to the one espoused in M.T., the case will probably remain an anomaly.
In short, M.T does not inspire confidence. See generally John Dwight Ingram, A
Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on the Right to Many--Why Can't Fred Marry
George-or Mary andAlice at the Same Time?, 10 J. op CoNTEMp. L 33, 51 (1984)
(reasoning that the focus on sexual capacity may not withstand an equal protection
challenge).
71. For example, "Such recognition will promote the individual's quest for inner peace
and personal happiness, while in no way disserving any societal interest, principle of
public order or precept of morality." MT., 355 A.2d at 211.
72. Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
73. Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
74. See Frances B., 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
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since in most jurisdictions transsexuals' sex, even post-surgery, is de-
termined, on the basis of chromosomes, to be the same as their
prospective spouses'.75 Such a marriage would be a nullity. On the
other hand, an attempt to marry someone of the same anatomical
though opposite chromosomal sex would also fail, since such a mar-
riage would likewise be nullity,76  consummation being quite
impossible absent the requisite genitalia.7
Although the reliance, or lack of reliance, on medical authority
may be one factor involved in the different outcomes, another, and
possibly related, factor might be the distinguishing factors presented
by the cases. In a case of medical necessity, a person in distress needs
intervention in order to be relieved of that distress. In a family law
case, though, and, demonstrated below, in cases implicating prisoners'
rights or employment discrimination proscriptions, the transsexual's
place in societal institutions, interacting with other people and form-
ing a part of the social fabric, is at issue.7s Juridical judgment implies
75. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971). Compare
M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. 1976), with In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828
(Ohio Misc. 1987).
76. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (nullifying mar-
riage between males, despite male petitioner's belief that preoperative MTF was
female at time of marriage and subsequently submitted to sex reassignment surgery).
77.. Such a result obtained in the case of Cossey v. United KIngdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.L.
(ser. A) (1990). Caroline Cossey, an MTF postoperative, claimed her human rights
were infringed because she was not allowed under British law to change the sex on
her birth certificate, with the result that she could not marry a man in Great Britain.
The case was referred by the European Commission on Human Rights to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, which ruled that her human rights had not been
infringed because she was still a man, and the European Convention on Human
Rights protects traditional marriages. Cossey remarked, "'I can't marry legally. I could
consummate a marriage with a man but it wouldn't be legal. I could marry a woman
legally but I couldn't consummate the marriage so it could would [sic] be null and
void, which is really silly.'" Karin Davies, Court Rules Transexual is Still a Man, UPI,
Sept. 28, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. In preparation for her
legal challenge to Great Britain's refusal to amend her birth certificate and allow her
to marry a man, Cossey submitted to a medical examination which verified that her
vagina "was large enough to accommodate a penis." CossEy, supra note 23, at 151.
78. Recall that in Doe v. State, Department of Public Welfare, the court disapproved the
welfare administration's standard of medical necessity which conditioned receipt of
medical assistance benefits on a showing that surgery to be paid for with those bene-
fits would eliminate the patient's disability and render him self-supporting. See Doe
v. State, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816, 821 (Minn. 1977). The standard
essentially required the full integration of the patient into society, post-surgery. One
wonders, if the standard had been approved, whether benefits for transsexual surgery
would have been granted as well, in light of the courts' prevention of transsexuals'
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that to recognize that men become women and women become men
via surgical intervention threatens to rend that fabric.
B. Parental Rights
In the area of parental rights, courts seek to maintain the binary
system of sex classification by severing, selectively, transsexuals' access
to their children. By denying MTF postoperative transsexuals their
fundamental right to be parents" and granting that same right to
FTM postoperative transsexuals," courts purport to evaluate the best
interest of the children in these cases, while actually singling out MTF
transsexuals for greater censure than their FTM counterparts.
In Daly v. Daly,8 a postoperative MTF, father to a young girl,
challenged a lower court's termination of her parental rights. The
lower court had issued the order for termination on the basis that the
father posed the risk of serious emotional or mental injury to her
daughter if visitation was permitted."2 Though the father did not re-
quest visitation privileges-she was instead willing to forgo them to
retain parental rights-the Supreme Court of Nevada gave credence to
the lower court's view that termination of parental rights was justified
given the risk of serious emotional harm to the child. 3 The court con-
cluded that "Suzanne [is] a selfish person whose own needs, desires
and wishes were paramount and were indulged without regard to their
impact on the life and psyche of the daughter.""
In Cisek v. Cisek,85 a case remarkably similar to Daly, a postop-
erative MTF father's visitation rights were terminated. Although the
trial court had refused to terminate the father's visitation rights, the
appellate court reversed, noting that the evidence showed the potential
integration into society in the cases of marriage, prisoners' rights, and employment
discrimination.
79. SeeM. L B. v. S. L J., - U.S.._, __, 117 S. Ct. 555, 566 (1996) ("In contrast to
loss of custody, which does not sever the parent-child bond, parental status termina-
tion is 'irretrievablty] destructi[ve]' of the most fundamental family relationship.")
(citation omitted).
80. Compare Dalyv. Daly, 715 P.2d 56 (Nev. 1986) with Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d
132 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
81. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56 (Nev. 1986).
82. SeeDaly, 715 P.2d at 58.
83. See Ddy, 715 P.2d at 59.
84. Day, 715 P.2d at 59.
85. Cisek v. Cisek, No. 80 CA.. 113, 1982 WL 6161 (Ohio Ct. App. July 20, 1982).
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for mental harm and that "common sense" indicated the potential for
social harm.86 The court then queried whether the father's change of
sex was "simply an indulgence of some fantasy[.]"'
The language of these cases contains an eerie parallel to Lamb v.
Maschner," a prisoners' rights case in which the plaintiff inmate was
described by the court as taking "an 'apparent delight in defying con-
ventions, rules and regulations"' and whose "medical history indicates
that he is a nonconformist," 9 and Supre v. Ricketts," in which prison
officials "opined that Supre's conduct was calculated and manipulat-
ive.""' The image of the transsexual thus portrayed is that of a
frivolous person who pays no heed to social order or conventions and
whose antics are essentially a call for attention., This language is vio-
lently contrary to the language of medical necessity employed in the
cases on the availability of public funding and private insurance for
sex reassignment surgery92 and contrasts as well with the view of Judge
Richard Posner:
[W]e should expect the converted transsexual to engender less
shock than the transvestite. (I believe this is true.) Transsexual
conversion, requiring as it does surgical and hormonal treat-
ments, is not facile impersonation. It is painful,
time-consuming, expensive-and irreversible. Transsexualism
does not imply that we can change our sexual identity by
changing our clothes."
Responding to Posner, Kenji Yoshino has remarked:
Transsexualism threatens settled sexual expectations less [than
transvestism] because it asks more of the body of the person
who engages in it. The painful and irreversible dues that must
be paid for such a subversion deter all but those who have
86. See Cisek, 1982 WL6161, at*2.
87. Cisek, 1982 WL 6161, at *2. A similar outcome obtained in J.L.S. v. D.KS., in
which the appellate court reversed the trial court's determination, supported by ex-
pert testimony, that joint custody by the MTF father and the mother was in the best
interests of the children. SeeJ.LS. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
88. Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1986).
89. Id. at 354.
90. Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986).
91. Id. at 967.
92. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text. See also Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319,
321 (7th Cir 1993) ("The defendants did not and do not deny that transsexualism is
not a frivolous 'life style' choice but a genuine psychiatric disorder for which a pris-
oner is entitled to receive medical or psychiatric treatment.").
93. RicHAm A. PosNE, SE x AND REASON 27(1992).
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good reasons to engage in it. Transsexualism achieves a kind of
moral seriousness because it cannot be a matter of mere play.
9'4
Neither Posner's nor Yoshino's theory is consistent with the views
propounded in Daly, Cisek, Lamb, and Supre in which the dues paid
by the transsexual achieved anything but a moral seriousness." Despite
the pain and irreversibility undertaken by the transsexual to integrate
mind and body, the legal system's settled sexual expectations are un-
dermined to the extent that denial to transsexuals of integration into
the social fabric, on the basis of chromosomal disharmony with the
other indicia of sex, appears inevitable. The "asking more of the body"
entailed by transsexualism is precisely why it is more subversive than is
transvestism: judicial preoccupation is with the body, not the cos-
tume. 6 That transsexuals have "good reasons" for altering their bodies
is an issue only in the medical necessity cases; aside from that, the ju-
diciary, as case law makes clear, views the transsexual as subversive and
94. Yoshino, supra note 9, at 1829-30.
95. Cf MARY Russo, THE FEmAuE GROTESQUE: RISK, ExcEss AND MODERNnY 3 (1994)
(describing function of grotesque images incorporated within Christian art during the
Renaissance as "mere fanciful decoration without moral import").
96. Since the law focuses on the body, not on gender, the point made in Patriarchy, that
the law favors the transsexual because of "the transsexual's concern with correcting
her gender transgression" by undergoing sex reassignment, is weak. Patriarchy, supra
note 37, at 1992. This focus on the body is not limited to the courts. Gay transsexu-
als have met resistance from gays and lesbians who believe that a transsexual is not
really gay if s/he is attracted to individuals who have genitals the transsexual was not
born with. See Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Gendered Politics ofIdentidy: Who Owns
the Label "Lesbian? 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 3, 12 n. 36 (1997) (describing
women who formed support group "with membership limited to women who had
been born into a female body" and lesbians at the Michigan Womyn's Music Festival
who excluded transsexual lesbians because they were not "'legitimately' born into fe-
male bodies"). But see Phyllis Frye, NLGLA Affirms BI and TG Incorporation in Its
By-Laws: ILGA Too!, Aug. 6, 1997 (press release) (on file with author) (reporting
that the Board of Directors of the National Lesbian and Gay Law Association af-
firmed Bisexual and Transgender incorporation in its by-laws); The Gay, Lesbian, &
Bisexual Speakers Bureau of Boston, Mission Statement Now Includes T's, April 18,
1997 (press release) (on file with author) (reporting expansion of mission statement
to include educating about the lives and experiences of transgendered persons); Gen-
der PAC, N.O.W. Passes TransInclusion, July 31, 1997 (press release) (on file with
author) (reporting passage by the National Organization for Women, after three years
of debate, of a transgender inclusion resolution); National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force, Thirty-Two States Gather for Historic Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual/Transgender
Movement Meeting; Federation of State Groups Launched, July 22, 1997 (press re-
lease) (on file with author) (Federation Mission statement includes "to facilitate
cooperation and communication among organizations whose primary mission is to




"at play." Unlike transsexualism, transvestism does not entail an al-
teration of body parts and thus, to critics of transsexualism, is not
grotesque in its essence. Thus, no erection of judicial barricades
against the encroachment of the excrescences and protuberances of the
grotesque is required. This state of affairs renders transsexuals, in the
view of the courts, at best more subversive than transvestites. Other-
wise judicial negation of their identities and of their participation in
society would be unnecessary.
C. Castration and the Female Father
One salient point of concern in cases involving the status of
transsexuals in family law is the judiciary's preoccupation with the
"castration" which takes place in sex reassignment surgery for MTFs.97
In describing sex reassignment surgery in Corbett, Judge Ormrod
commented, "I have been at some pains to avoid the use of emotive
expressions such as 'castration' and 'artificial vagina' without the
qualification 'so-called' because the association of ideas connected
with these words or phrases are so powerful that they tend to cloud
clear thinking.""8
In the United States, while courts have characterized transsexual-
ism as a nonconformist ploy for attention, the same courts have
focused on plaintiffs being "what remains of a man"99 and a "vestigial
parent."' ° More specifically, the Daly court concluded that Suzanne
Daly had brought the wrath of society upon herself; by "discard[ing]
his fatherhood," Suzanne "in a very real sense... terminated her own
parental rights."'0 ' Both of these descriptions focus squarely on what
the MTFs left behind in their transition from anatomically male to
anatomically and psychologically female.
In a similar vein, nearly twenty years after Corbett, Judge Orm-
rod, in a letter to Henry Finlay, referred to the "fascination shown by
some judges and academic lawyers with the legal consequences of con-
structing a so-called artificial vagina (the rectum serves almost as well
or better!). But what of female/male transsexuals. Surel, all of us
males would blanch at an artificial non-fincti6ning appendage. I
97. See supra note 23.
98. Corbettv. Corbett, 2 W.LR. 1306, 1310 (P.1970).
99. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
100. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 59 (Nev. 1986).
101. Daly, 715 P.2d at 59.
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prefer chromosomes. " l'e This passage suggests that shock alone has led
the judiciary to rule that chromosomes are preferable to outward
anatomy for the purposes of establishing sexual identity. With regard
to the "castration" of MTFs, an explanation for the shock and fear
occasioned by it appears in Freud's "Fetishism:" "[I]f a woman ha[s]
been castrated, then [a man's] own possession of a penis [is] in danger
... ,, 103 Judith Shapiro has noted some theorists' view that transsexu-
als' focus on genitals is itself fetishistic, but she argues that
"transsexuals are, in fact, conforming to the culture's criteria for gen-
der assignment."'
Transsexualism, then, and, more particularly, the recognition of
MTFs' sexual identity, embodies the promise of institutionalized cas-
tration. Castration for the courts does not represent alignment of
one's body with one's psychological sex, but a failure of the body to
"be situated on either side of the sexual paradigm[:] implicit in it are a
Female beyond (perfection), and a Male short of it (being castrated)."' '
Thus, Suzanne Daly, like La Zambinella the castrato in Sarrasine, "is
marked both by perfection and by deficiency."'06 On the one hand,
she is a woman, "perfect" insofar as having achieved congruence of her
psychological (inward) and genital (outward) sexes, but at the same
time, and most importantly for the courts, "she is sub-man, castrated,
deficient, definitively ess."' 0 Legal recognition under this set of cir-
cumstances is impossible.
08
There is the lingering sense, though, that the judiciary's opposi-
tion to inclusion of transsexuals in the social fabric is motivated by
102. Finlay, supra note 18, at 508.
103. 21 SIGMUND FREUD, Fetishism, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSY-
CHOLOGICAL WORMs OF SIGMUND FREUD 152,153 (James Strachey trans., 1961). See
aso Twardy, supra note 38, at 295 (quoting "San Martin," CNCrim. y Correc.
[1996] LL 605, 613 (Arg.) (" 'The nature of the crime must also be considered be-
cause the act per se constitutes a grievous assault on the man in his capacity as a man,
and in more general terms, an absolute disregard for the social [natural] law-the one
above all the norms of [positive] law and morality-: the preservation of the spc-
cies.' )).
104. Judith Shapiro, Transsexualism: Reflections on the Persistence of Gender and the Muta-
bility ofSex, in BODY GuARDs, supra note 18, at 248, 260.
105. BARTHEs, supra note 3, at 72-73.
106. BARTHEs, supra note 3, at 72.
107. BARTHES, supra note 3, at 72.
108. Sarrasine emphasizes the horror of the discovery that a supposed female is in fact a
castrato: "'Monster! You who can give life to nothing. For me, you have wiped
women from the earth.'" HONORA DE BALZAC, SARRAsINE, reprinted in BARTHEs, su-
pra note 3, app. at 252.
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more than just disapprobation of frivolity and fear of the social sanc-
tioning of the loss of collective genitals. Kenji Yoshino, invoking an
image of transsexuals as modern-day sorcerers, has remarked that
"[t]ranssexuals violate the corollary [one body, one sex] by surgically
changing from one sex to another, obtaining special knowledge of
how it is to operate both as a man and a woman in society."'09 Adri-
enne Hiegel, writing on the Americans with Disabilities Act's explicit
exclusion of sexual minorities as reflective of the Act's endorsing a
moral tradition of intolerance, has remarked that "[U egal penalties
and cultural taboos punish transgressions that threaten the social order
built on this system of exclusive bodies, making the notion of perver-
sion indispensable to our culture..' ... Perhaps the explanation of the
judiciary's stance with respect to transsexuals encompasses a bit of
both of these; the judiciary's ultimate understanding of transsexualism
centers not only upon its potential for societal disruption, but also
upon its potential to sunder civilization.
In Totem and Taboo"' and its continuation Moses and Monothe-
ism,"2  Freud examines the underpinnings of human social
organization via a narration of the mythic origins of civilization and
the concomitant taboos essential to its maintenance. Taboos are
"forbidden action[s] for which there exists a strong inclination in the
unconscious," 3 and according to Freud, they derive from a significant
event which occurred in the context of what he terms the primal
horde. According to the theory, the sons of the ruler of the primal
horde banded together and killed their father whom they resented
for keeping the women of the horde to himself. The sons feared that
their desiring the women would arouse the father's jealousy with the
result that they would be "killed or castrated or driven out.'14 The
murder of the father, which amounts to original sin"5 in this mythic
109. Yoshino, supra note 9, at 1829.
110. Adrienne L Hiegel, Note, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as a
Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1451, 1484 (1994).
111. SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABoo: RSEMBLANCES BETWEEN THE PSYCHIC Lrv-s
OF SAVAGES AND NEUROTICS (A.A. Brill trans., 1927) [hereinafter TOTEM AND TA-
BOO].
112. 23 SIGMUND FREUD, Moses and Monotheism, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGIC.L WORuKS OF SIGMUND FREUD (James Strachey trans.,
1964) [hereinafter Moses and Monotheism].
113. ToTEM AND TABOO, supra note 111, at 56.
114. Moses and Monotheism, supra note 112, at 81.
115. "Mhe state of sin that according to Christian theology characterizes all human be-
ings as a result of Adam's fall." MEmtwA WEBSTER!S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 820
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116context, is motivated by greaf temptation, but results in guilt and an
urgency to atone for the criminal act. Atonement lies in the veneration
of a totem, an emblem of the father's mythic force. Desecration of this
totem becomes taboo, and its commission must be atoned for through
punishment. "In these regulations [against killing or injuring the to-
tem] are to be seen the first beginnings of a moral and social order.
'' 17
Nonetheless, the temptation to desecrate the totem arises from the
"return of the repressed," of which guilt is the precursor."' Freud
characterizes the temptation as a contagion: individuals who violate
the taboo arouse envy and carry the dangerous propensity to tempt
others to follow suit."' Herein lies the specter of social dissolution
"which must be punished or expiated by all the members of society
lest it harm them all." 2' Addressing this temptation requires measures
which will maintain "the new order which succeeded the father's re-
moval. Otherwise a relapse into the earlier state would have become
inevitable.'' Whoever voluntarily submits to castration threatens this
relapse." Thus, "[t]he one-sex model can be read.., as an exercise in
preserving the Father, he who stands not only for order but for the
very existence of civilization itself."'
(10th ed. 1993) [hereinafter WEsTa's]. See aso TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note
111 at 268 ("In the Christian myth man's original sin is undoubtedly an offence
against God the Father, and if Christ redeems mankind from the weight of original
sin by sacrificing his own life, he forces us to the conclusion that this sin was mur-
der.").
116. See Moses and Monotheism, supra note 112, at 86.
117. Moses and Monotheism, supira note 112, at 119.
118. SeeMoses andMonotheism, supra note 112, at 86, 127.
119. See TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note 111, at 57.
120. TOTEM AND TABOO, supra note 111, at 59. See also BARTHEs, supra note 3, at 66
("Antithesis [ cannot be transgressed with impunity... [Iln copying woman, in as-
suming her position on the other side of the sexual barrier, the castrato will transgress
morphology, grammar, discourse, and because of this abolition of meaning Sarrasine
will die."); Twardy, supra note 38, at 305 (quoting "San Martin," CNCrim. y Cor-
rec. [1966] LL 605, 613 (Arg.) ("'Mankind would subsist although every man in
this world were to have his arms cut off, were to lose his property, his honor and his
fatherland. However, if an act such as [sex reassignment surgery] were allowed to go
unpunished-a gap would be opened into which the whole human race could
fall.' )).
121. MosEs AND MONOTHEISM, supra note 112, at 119.
122. See MOSES AND MONOTHEISM, supra note 112, at 122.
123. Defined as a model of sex classification based on the "self-evident greater potency of
the male over the female." THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING S.x: BODY AND GENDER
FROM THE GPRus TO FREUD 58 (1990).
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The image of the transsexual in contemporary jurisprudence
comprises the images of a castrating woman, a castrated man, and in
Daly and Cisek, the image of a female father. The deployment by
MTFs of the image of the transsexual into the social consciousness
invokes the danger of permitting those who submit voluntarily to cas-
tration to weaken the underpinnings of society. It is precisely this
submission to the will of the mythical castrating father that social
codes, set up to atone for the murder of that father, seek to suppress."'
Thus, in Daly, while "vestigial parent" conveys the fact of parenthood,
it at the same time masks the sexual identity of the father. In Corbett,
Ormrod evaded the issue by characterizing the view that a father can
become female as absurd:
If the "assignment" to the female sex is made after the opera-
tion, then the operation has changed the sex. From this it
would follow that if a 50 year old male transsexual, married
and the father of children, underwent the operation, he would
then have to be regarded in law as a female and capable of
"marrying" a man. The results would be nothing if not bi-
125
zarre.
Bizarre, maybe, but in the end nonetheless true: with advances in sci-
ence, the "castrated" MTF postoperative is fully capable of
procreating.' 2
Notably, the social punishment imposed on the MTF fathers in
Daly and Cisek was not inflicted upon the male mother in Christian v.
Randall.'27 In that case the FTM custodial mother was undergoing sex
reassignment, had changed her name and had remarried. The father
petitioned for custody of their four daughters. This petition was
granted based solely on the mother's transsexualism, but the appellate
court reversed, noting the "high quality of the environment and home
life" that the mother offered the children and the lack of evidence
124. ButseeJta'e G. RAYmOND, TRANsSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-MALE
79, 81-82, 87-88 (1979) (understanding transsexualism to be about men producing
women that more adequately fit male stereotypes of femininity).
125. Corbett v. Corbett, 2 W.LR. 1306, 1325 (P. 1970).
126. See Hage, supra note 14, at 110. ("It should be noted that modern reproductive
methods such as sperm storage, ovum storage, in vitro fertilisation [sic], and use of
surrogate mothers do not preclude a transsexual from procreating as a member of the
original sex, even after the date of sex reassignment surgery.").
127. Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d 132 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
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suggesting the mother's relationship with the children had been ad-
versely affected or that they were likely to suffer emotional harm.'
28
Christian demonstrates that the legal system is not as concerned
with the grotesque qualities of transsexual bodies per se as it is with
the social upheaval posed by---and which has resulted in the taboo
against-castration and the assumption of female fatherhood. n'9 As we
have seen, medical authority, deferred to by the law, considers the
transsexual tempted, if not compelled, to become the opposite ana-
tomical sex and thereby to achieve congruence between anatomical
and psychological sexual characteristics. While the legal system agrees
that the temptation is great, it operates to discourage and penalize its
indulgence, ensuring that a weakening of societal foundations not en-
sue. Both the Daly and Cisek opinions reveal the operation of this
theory; since'the urge to cross sexual boundaries by submitting to cas-
tration is tempting, its indulgence must entail some form of
authoritative curtailment of liberty, which could presumably also serve
as a deterrent to the transgression. Whether this result today is due to
the fundamental male horror at castration or due to the sense of guilt
over the murder of the symbolic father-ruler are questions warranting
further discussion. For the law, in any court, indulging the compul-
sion constitutes commission of the prohibited act of transgressing
sexual boundaries; such a transgression must be punished.
The significance of these cases is great. The courts' stance ulti-
mately poses the larger question of whether the will to transgress
sexual boundaries, embodied in the image of transsexualism, would
not be tempting for more people if the curtailment of liberty resulting
from its indulgence were removed. Such an outcome, demanding a
fundamental reconceptualization of societal order, may be a major
factor in the law's lack of compassion for transsexuals.
128. See Christian, 516 P.2d at 134.
129. For an alternative explanation see RAYMOND, supra note 124, at 27-28, 173 (positing
that the patriarchy uses FTMs as tokens providing a smokescreen for the truth of the
transsexual phenomenon). Compare Case's view that effeminate men are less likely to
recover under Title VII than are masculine women. See Mary Anne C. Case, Dihag-
gregating Gender From Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law
and Feminist Juriprudence, 105 YAE UJ. 1, 47 (1995). ButseeX, Y and Z v. United
Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 22 1997) <http://www.hcour.coe.fr/eng/XYZ.html>
(no violation of human rights to deny official recognition of the fatherhood of a post-




Cases involving transsexualism and prisoners' rights offer further
evidence of how the judiciary defers to medical authority in some
cases and ignores it in others. While medical discourse concludes that
sex reassignment is the most promising treatment option for trans-
sexuals, focusing on the individual transsexual's needs, the discourse in
transsexual prisoners' rights cases focuses alternatively on the societal
interest in a secure prison environment. This focus is of course not
unique to cases involving transsexual prisoners. Nearly all prisoners'
challenges to the conditions of prison life involve, in the end, a bal-
ancing of rights versus risks."3 In the main, courts apply a rational
relationship analysis, with a high degree of deference to prison offi-
cials' discretion, in such cases.
131
Transsexual prisoners' rights cases involve MTFs who are in need
of estrogen and at risk of assault in the prison population. Under Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons policy, preoperative transsexuals are housed
with those of the same biological sex, postoperatives are housed with
those of their reassigned sex. 2 Even though the cases in this area do
not focus squarely on the sexual identity of postoperative transsexuals,
they are nonetheless analogous to the marriage cases in that they illus-
trate how, from a judicial standpoint, transsexuals threaten to rend the
social fabric-either of the prison, by creating a volatile and unstable
environment, or of the institution of marriage, by seeking legal recog-
nition of their psychological sex.
1. Denial of Estrogen
An issue common in transsexual prisoners' rights cases is whether
prison officials' denial of estrogen treatment constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
130. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
822-23 (1974) (evoking the balancing between prisoners' constitutional rights and
institutional objectives, namely security, institutional order and discipline, and prison
officials' discretion in determining what regulation the attainment of those objectives
warrants). See generally COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAw REVIw, A JArLHOUSE LAw-
YaRns MANUAL (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter JAILHousE Lw m's MANUAL].
131. See, e.g., Be/h 441 U.S. at 557 (applying Fourth Amendment balancing test to room-
search rule).
132. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994).
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standard for analyzing this issue, announced by the Supreme Court in
Estelle v. Gamble,' is difficult to satisfy: the prisoner must establish
prison officials' "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs."'"
Although courts have found that transsexualism constitutes a serious
medical need,' the judiciary has concluded that transsexual prisoners
have no constitutional right to estrogen therapy'36 provided that some
other treatment option is available. 37 Prison officials need only pro-
vide the transsexual inmate with some form of treatment, e.g.,
counseling or even testosterone replacement, at their discretion.'
Transsexual inmates have launched several unsuccessful actions to
compel prison officials to provide them with estrogen.'39 In Meri-
wether v. Faulkner, the Seventh Circuit considered the plight of a
preoperative MTF who had undergone nine years of estrogen treat-
ment, resulting in "chemical castration," and surgical alteration of her
facial structure, breasts and hips. The inmate, denied estrogen by
prison officials, filed suit challenging the available medical care. The
Court of Appeals, reversing the District Court, held that gender
dysphoria was a serious medical need' ° and cited several cases in
which courts "expressly rejected the notion that transsexual surgery is
properly characterized as cosmetic surgery, concluding instead that
such surgery is medically necessary for the treatment of transsexual-
ism. ", 41 Since the transsexual inmate was receiving no medical
treatment in prison, the court found her claim valid, declaring that "a
transsexual inmate is constitutionally entitled to some type of medical
133. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
134. Id at 104.
135. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text. See also Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821
F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987).
136. See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding a prisoner has no
constitutional right to preoperative hormone treatment and sex change operation).
137. See Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995); Meriwether, 821 F.2d at
413.
138. See Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 1996) (psychotherapy as an alternative
to tranquilizers); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1986) (testosterone
replacement as an alternative to estrogen); Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351,
353-4 (D. Kan. 1986) (mental health treatment as an alternative to hormone treat-
ment).
139. As was the case in Meriwether, these claims are invariably brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
140. See Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 413.
141. Id at 412.
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treatment,"'4 but adding the caveat that "she does not have a right to
any particular type of treatment such as estrogen therapy .... ,,4
Supre v. Ricketts'" was the case of a transsexual inmate who was
driven to mutilate her genitals to the point where her testicles had to
be surgically removed. Supre's development of breast tissue' while in
prison and her acts of self mutilation led prison officials to label her,
chillingly, "a difficult management problem"4 6 and to decide that
testosterone replacement was an appropriate medical treatment. The
court deferred to the discretion of the prison officials,147 thus adhering
to the principle that estrogen treatment is not required in a prison
setting. In a particularly humane dissent, Circuit Judge Stephanie
Seymour found Supre:
... no ordinary transsexual, but one driven to acts of self-
emasculation. Prison officials put off her pleas for estrogen
even though she mutilated herself repeatedly and attempted
suicide. Such a failure to act raises an inference of deliberate
indifference .... 48
In Farmer v. Carlson,"' Dee Farmer, a preoperative MTF who
had undergone bodily changes as a result of the estrogen 
therapy 50
brought suit for denial of estrogen.' 5 The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the prison officials," 2 deferring to the informed
medical judgment of the prison doctors: "the proper treatment for
people who have a normal generic complement ... remains firmly in
the providence of psychotherapy, not in hormonal or surgical ma-
nipulation." ' The doctors in the case had further concluded that
prescription of estrogen for Farmer posed a health risk.' Upon
transfer to a different prison, Farmer was diagnosed as a transvestite,
not a transsexual, and thus received no medical treatment for her
142. Meriwether, 821 F.2d. at 412.
143. 1,1 at 413.
144. Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986).
145. Termed "gynecomastia." See Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1337 (M.D. Pa.
1988).
146. Supre, 792 F.2d at 961.
147. See Supre, 792 F.2d at 963.
148. Supre, 792 F.2d at 966-67.
149. Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
150. See id. at 1337.
151. Seeid. at 1338.
152. See Carson, 685 F. Supp. at 1346.
153. Id at 1340.
154. See Carlson, 685 F. Supp. at 1340.
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transsexualism.' The appellate court reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment for the prison officials,' but a subse-
quent jury trial resulted in a verdict against Farmer.57 Further
litigation by Farmer revealed that while in prison she had successfully
obtained contraband estrogen, but had not developed breasts.'
2. Administrative Segregation and Assault
The series of claims brought by Dee Farmer has triggered much
controversy and illustrates two other issues facing transsexuals in
prison-their placement in protective custody and the risk of assault
they run by remaining in the general prison population."'
Placement in administrative segregation is meant to reduce the risk
of assault"6° or to, in effect, quarantine inmates carrying communicable
155. See Farmerv. Haas, No. 90-1088, 1991 WL26456, at*3 (7th Cir. Feb. 14, 1991).
156. See Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 320 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denie, 510 U.S. 963
(1993).
157. Seeid, at 320.
158. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 319, 825-29 (1994) (noting that although Farmer
did not develop breasts while in prison, overall, she nonetheless projected a decidedly
feminine appearance).
In Phillips v. Michigan Department of Corrections, the court deemed prison offi-
cials' refusal to continue a transsexual life inmate's estrogen therapy a probable Eighth
Amendment violation and ordered the officials to provide estrogen pending the out-
come of a trial. See Phillips v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 731 F. Supp. 792, 801
(W.D. Mich. 1990), affd without opinion, 932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991). This dis-
trict court decision is not reflected in more recent case law in this area, however, and
plays the role that M. T does in the marriage context. Moreover, in Phillips, the court
had before it evidence of the physical injury suffered by denying estrogen from one
whose body had been significantly altered by years of hormone therapy.
159. See Brennan, 511 U.S. 825; Haas, 990 F.2d 319; Farmer v. Haas, 1991 WL 26456,
at *1; Farmer v. Hawk, No. 94-CV-2274(GK), 1996 WL 525321 (D.D.C. Sept. 5,
1996); Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335. For commentary on Farmer v. Brennan, see John
Boston et al., Legal Commentary, Farmer v. Brennan: Defining Deliberate Indifference
Under the Eighth Amendment, 14 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. Rv. 83 (1994); Stacy Lan-
caster Cozad, Note, Cruel But Not So Unusua. Farmer v. Brennan and the Devolving
Standards ofDecency, 23 PEPP. L RLv. 175 (1995); Marjorie Riflcin, Farmer v. Bren-
nan: Spotlight on an Obvious Risk of Rape in a Hidden World, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTs.
L REv. 273 (1995); Jason D. Sanabria, Note and Comment, Farmer v. Brennan: Do
Prisoners Have Any Rights Left Under the Eighth Amendment?, 16 WHrrER L Ray.
1113 (1995).
160. See, e.g., Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 417 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Given her
transsexual identity and unique physical characteristics, her being housed ... in a




disease."' While such segregation is meant to afford protection to in-
mates at risk of assault, it often entails a drastic curtailment of
privileges which might include denial of use of the law library, de-
creased eligibility for work detail, and housing in physical
surroundings inferior to those enjoyed by the general prison popula-
tion.6 2 Thus, inmates have launched challenges to their administrative
segregation on the basis of due process and equal protection,6' alleg-
ing that they have a protected liberty interest in being confined in the
general prison population rather than in restrictive segregation and
that they have been the target of an arbitrary and unreasonable classi-
fication. These challenges have largely failed, however, the judiciary
having decided that a prisoner has no liberty interest in remaining in
the general population, since "less amenable and more restrictive
quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confine-
ment ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence."'" With respect
to equal protection claims, the court applies the rational basis test and
inevitably concludes that the classification is reasonably related to the
professional exercise of prison officials' judgment in promoting le-• 165
gitimate security interests.
Whereas placement in administrative segregation is consistent
with a prison sentence, assault is not.1" In contrast to administrative
segregation, "[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply not 'part
of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society,' ,,167 and "'prison officials have a duty under the [Eighth] and
161. See, e.g., Hawk, 1996 WL 525321, at *1 (inmate challenged constitutionality of Bu-
reau of Prisons' policy of segregation of HIV-positive inmates from the general prison
population).
162. SeeJAiLHousE IYWYER's MANuAL, supra note 130, at 405.
163. See, e.g., Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1338 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (inmate
challenged her placement, for four and one-half months, in administrative segrega-
tion).
164. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983).
165. See, e.g., Carlon, 685 F. Supp. at 1344.
166. See Brennan, 511 U.S. at 832. The Brennan court said:
In its prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments," the Eighth
Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for exam-
ple, use excessive physical force against prisoners. The Amendment also
imposes duties on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of
confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate
food, dothing, shelter, and medical care, and must "take reasonable meas-
ures to guarantee the safety of the inmates."
Brennan, 511 U.S. at 832 (citations omitted).
167. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
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[Fourteenth] amendments to protect prisoners from violence at the
hands of other prisoners."' 68 The duty, more specifically, is "'to exer-
cise reasonable care to provide reasonable protection from an
unreasonable risk of harm."" 69 This unreasonable risk of harm is es-
tablished where a plaintiff shows that there "was a 'strong likelihood
that violence will occur."" 7 Normally, an inmate will adduce evi-
dence regarding the basis of his fear of being assaulted. The court then
undertakes an analysis of the reasonableness of this fear.' 7' To establish
fear of this dimension, "'an inmate must show more than simple
anxiety,"" 72 though the standard does not require the prisoner to have
already been victimized.'"73
Targets of sexual assault are often young, effeminate and newly
admitted.' 7 Thus, transsexuals are at risk of assault in prison, not only
because they are perceived to be transsexual, but because their
"appearance ... departs from traditional notions of an acceptable
masculine demeanor."' 75 For transsexual inmates, the right to be free
from assault dovetails with the issue of protective custody. Very gener-
ally, there are those prisoners who require protective custody because
they fear assault, and those who do not desire protective custody,
whether they fear assault or not, because protective custody is usually
far less desirable than being housed in the general population.
The risk of assault also dovetails with prison officials' denial of
estrogen. While the natural effeminacy of a prisoner cannot likely be
changed, the feminizing effects of estrogen, including gynecomastia,
can be averted or undone to a degree by simple denial of access to
estrogen therapy. Masculinization can be achieved by the prescrip-
tion of a regimen of testosterone replacement. Denial of estrogen to
168. Purvis v. Ponte, 929 F.2d 822, 825 (1st Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (quoting
Leonardo v. Moran, 611 F. 2d 397, 398-99 (1st Cir. 1979)).
169. Purvis, 929 F.2d at 825 (quoting Lovell v. Brennan, 728 F.2d 560, 564 (1st Cir.
1984)).
170. Purvis, 929 F.2d at 825 (quoting Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339-40 (7th Cir.
1985)).
171. See, e.g., Purvis, 929 F.2d at 825.
172. Purvis, 929 F.2d at 825 (quoting Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 979 (4th Cir.
1985)).
173. See United States v. Gonzalez, 945 F.2d 525, 527 (2d Cir. 1991).
174. See Doe v. Lally, 467 F. Supp. 1339, 1349 (D. Md. 1979).
175. Gonzalez, 945 F.2d at 526 (departing downward from minimum required sentence
in a case involving a defendant of slight, effeminate demeanor); see also United States
v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 605 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that personal characteristics of
defendant, including immature appearance and admitted bisexuality, created a pecu-
liar vulnerability justifying a downward departure of his sentence).
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transsexual inmates is attractive to prison officials presumably because
sex reassignment surgery is unavailable to inmates,"r6 and preventing a
male inmate from becoming in any way feminized while housed with
the male population diminishes the potential for an otherwise volatile
prison setting.
177
Thus, while sex reassignment surgery is deemed a medical neces-
sity in the treatment of transsexualism, in the prison context, prison
officials, vested with nearly full discretion, can not only override a
transsexual's access to such surgery, but can deny access to hor-
mones. 78 The required "some treatment" can be as ineffectual as
• . 79 •180
counseling" or as outrageous as testosterone replacement.
It seems that when transsexuals are imprisoned, they are doubly
so: sex reassignment surgery is still medically necessary but in prison
inappropriate and inadvisable, even in light of the fact that postop-
eratives are housed with those of their reassigned sex. Transsexuals in
this bind will most likely have no choice but to request protective
176. See Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351, 353-54 (D. Kan. 1986) (finding that sex
reassignment surgery is inappropriate and inadvisable in a prison setting).
177. For a similar view, see Debra Sherman Tedeschi, The Predicament of the Transsexual
Prisoner, 5 TmvP. PoL- & Civ. RTs. L REv. 27,44 (1995).
178. See Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 414 ("[G]iven the wide variety of options available for
the treatment of gender dysphoria and the highly controversial nature of some of
those options, a federal court should defer to the informed judgment of prison offi-
cials as to the appropriate form of medical treatment.").
179. See CossEY, supra note 23, at 91 (relating, with regard to therapy, that "I did go back
just once, after the operation. But in common with many transsexuals, I didn't feel
that therapy could offer me anything. It was my body that needed attending to, not
my mind."); Hage, supra note 14, at 110 ("[N]onsurgical treatment of transsexuality
is generally believed to be enormously disappointing."); HUNT, supra note 23, at 29
("All the literature on the subject seems to agree that psychiatry has a zero batting av-
erage in curing transsexuals."); ERwrNK KoaRNnI, TP.AssExU As'rr IN THE MALE:
THE SPEcTRuM OF GENDER DYSPHORIA 157 (1980) ("Psychological treatment forms,
be they analytical or behavioral in orientation, are effective therapeutic tools in many
other instances but fil as a rule with transsexuals, who are rarely, if ever, interested in
what these treatments can offer."); JOHN MONEY, SEx ERORS OF THE BODY AND RE-
LATED SYNDROMES 85 (1994) ("Psychotherapy has proved to be ineffectual in
changing the body image fixation on sex reassignment in the fully developed syn-
drome of transsexualism."). But see Hiegel, supra note 110, at 1474 n.133
(maintaining, without authority, that doctors prefer psychotherapy "particularly in
situations where the power relation between the doctor and the transsexual is tilted
towards the doctor, as in cases of prison incarceration.").
180. See Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 960, 962-63 (10th Cir. 1986) (testosterone
replacement therapy offered after castration of transsexual inmate).
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custody, instead of being able to obtain the necessary surgery and then
request a transfer to a women's facility.1
81
The repeated denial of estrogen to transsexual prisoners in case
after case appears consistent, but it is perhaps internally inconsistent,
masking a deeper preoccupation and concern. Looking beyond. the
facial, one sees that the discourse in transsexual prisoners' rights cases
is multi-layered. On one level, the discourse of security, employing
references to potential panic, disorder, chaos and explosive situations,
seeks to ensure the stability and quiescence of the prison environment;
on another level, discussion of providing disincentives to transsexuals
from seeking protective custody and denying them estrogen is a dis-
course of erasure, suggesting that transsexualism will "take care of
itself," or will be taken care of by other inmates, if ignored by prison
authorities. In this way, the discourse positions the transsexual as a
locus of prescribed violence, whether in the form of assault or of
physical and emotional damage occasioned by the denial of estrogen.
E. Employment Discrimination
Employment discrimination jurisprudence at both the federal
and state levels also captures transsexuals in a discourse of exclusion
from social participation. This wide net, cast using a remarkably re-
fined system of semantic manipulations, snags all claims launched
by transsexuals and reveals that no matter how a transsexual frames
her discrimination claim, it will fail.112 A review of the case law
181. See Lamb, 633 F. Supp. at 353 (denying transfer to preoperative MTF due to the
"violation of women's rights" at issue).
182. This Article will discuss the minority position advanced by the New York courts. See
infra notes 251-258 and accompanying text. Discussion of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act and certain state statutes, all of which expressly
exclude transsexuals from their purview, is beyond the scope of this Article. See 42
U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(d); 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; IND. CODE
§ 22-9-5-6(d)(3) (1996); IOWA CODE § 225C.46(2)(b) (1997); LA. RV. STAT. ANN.
§ 51:2232(11)(b) (West 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(9) (1996); OHio REV.
CODEANN. § 4112.01(16)(b)(ii) (Anderson 1995).
Note that some courts have looked to these express exclusions to find that trans-
sexualism is not a physical disability under state law. See, e.g., Dobre v. Nat'l RR
Passenger Corp. ("Amtrak"), 850 F. Supp. 284, 289 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Conway v.
City of Hartford, No. CV 950553003, 1997 WL 78585, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Feb. 4, 1997); Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 476
(Iowa 1983); Holt v. Northwest Pa. Training Partnership Consortium, Inc., 694
A.2d 1134, 1139 (Pa. Comnw. Ct. 1997). In Conway, in contrast to the other three
cases, transsexualism was deemed a mental disorder by virtue of its being defined as
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demonstrates: (1) the miscategorization of transsexualism as a matter
of sexual orientation; (2) the conflation of the terms "biological,"
"anatomical," and "chromosomal;" (3) the misprision of the relation
between "sex" and "gender;" and (4) the assumed irrelevance of refer-
ences to transsexual plaintiffs' pasts and to the public's perception of
their identities. The judiciary consistently betrays a willingness to
deny transsexuals the protection of the sex discrimination proscrip-
tions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964183 and of its state law
analogs.
1. Claims Based on Transsexualism: Miscategorization
Courts have concluded that Title VII's sex discrimination prohi-
bitions do not prohibit discrimination based on transsexualism by
miscategorizing transsexualism with sexual orientation."' According to
the judiciary, Congress's rejection of several bills introduced to amend
Tide VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual preference
demonstrates the statute's use of the traditional definition of sex,",
such in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), and its inclusion in the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. See
Conway, 1997 WL 78585, at *5.
183. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) to 2000e-17.
184. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750
(8th Cir. 1982); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.
1978), affg 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977); Grossman v. Bernards Township Bd. of
Educ., 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1976), affg No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302, at *4
(D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897 (1976); Powell v. Read's, Inc.,
436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. Md. 1977) (noting that the position of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission is that discrimination against transsexuals is not
prohibited by existing law). But see RuTH CoL.ER, HYBRID: BIsaxs, MULTiRA-
CLALS, AND OTHER MIsRrs UNDER AMERICAN LAW 108 (1996) (arguing that since
the word "transsexual" refers to one's sex, discrimination on this basis is sex discrimi-
nation).
185. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085-86 (enumerating unsuccessful attempts by members of
Congress to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based upon "affectational or
sexual orientation"). In Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., the court used a similar
rationale to conclude that sex, as it is used in Tide VII, is not synonymous with gen-
der. See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661-62. Some courts have determined that
discrimination on the basis of sexual preference is not prohibited by Tide VII's pro-
hibition of sex discrimination. See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990); DeSantis v.
Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979); Blum v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cit. 1979).
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which by implication excludes transsexualism.' To reach this conclu-
sion, courts embrace Webster's remarkably unilluminating definition
of sex" and disregard the medical consensus that sex exists along a
continuum and is thus defined with reference to several factors.' In a
manner inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes of Title VII, *89
the courts point to legislative activity subsequent to the enactment of
Title VII to frustrate claims of employment discrimination brought by
transsexuals. 9
In jurisdictions whose state employment discrimination statutes
include sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for discrimination,
courts insist that transsexualism has nothing to do with sexual orien-
tation, thus further frustrating claims brought by transsexuals on that
basis. In Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc.,1' for example, the transsex-
ual plaintiff, presumably aware of how federal courts were construing
Congress's failure to include sexual orientation with other prohibited
bases for discrimination, tied her sex discrimination claim to the in-
clusion of sexual orientation in the New York City equivalent of Title
VII'9  The court rejected this theory, disagreeing with the federal
courts' contention that the failure of Congress to include the term
Csexual orientation"'93 in Tide VII demonstrated an intent to exclude
186. Butsee Case, supra note 129, at 48-49 (noting that a strict construction of the statute
supports protection for transsexuals routinely appearing for work in women's attire,
"if the skirts and dresses were of a sort the employer did not object to its female em-
ployees wearing").
187. 1 : either of the two major forms of individuals ... that are distinguished
respectively as female or male [,] 2 : the sum of the structural, functional,
and behavioral characteristics of living things that are involved in repro-
duction by two interacting parents and that distinguish males and females
WEBSTmeR'S, supra note 115, at 1073.
188. See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977) (relying on traditional notions of
sex).
189. See United Steelworkers of Am. AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 215 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
190. See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086 (using Congress's rejection of attempts to broaden
the scope of Title VII as evidence that it "had a narrow view of sex in mind when it
passed the Civil Rights Act"); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750
(8th Cir. 1982) ("The fact that the proposals were defeated indicates that the word
'sex' in Title VII is to be given its traditional definition, rather than an expansive in-
terpretation."); Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 (failure to add sexual orientation shows
"that Congress had only the traditional notions of 'sex' in mind").
191. Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
192. SeeNEwYoRx CrryADMiN. CODE, § 8-107, subd. I (a) (1996).
193. The court defined "sexual orientation" as follows:
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transsexuals.'94 The court remarked that "[t]here is a clear distinction
between homosexuals and transsexuals."195 The court also cited Un-
derwood v. Archer Management Services, Inc., 96 a case brought under
the District of Columbia Human Rights Act,'97 in which the court
held that transsexuality and homosexuality are distinct. 98
It is possible that the courts' miscategorization of transsexualism
with sexual orientation is inadvertent or at least based on a misappre-
hension of scientific discourse. The courts' own choice of language
suggests inadvertence: "This Court is ever sensitive to the need to as-
sist those who find themselves caught in the human turmoil of a
psychological sexual orientation that is in conflict with their actual
anatomical sex. " 9
Another explanation for this miscategorization might be the con-
flation of sexual orientation with gender identity in scientific
iterature,20 or the opinion of certain medical professionals that trans-
sexualism is the manifestation of disguised homosexuality.2"' Whatever
the reason, "[t] he association of social gender atypicality with minority
sexual orientation is used to substitute sexual orientation for sex and
gender in legal analyses of sex/gender discrimination." 20 2 By equating
transsexualism with sexual orientation, the courts, in jurisdictions
[It refers to] sexual preferences and practices, i.e., the sex of a person's sex-
ual partner, with heterosexuals being persons sexually attracted to members
of the opposite sex, homosexuals being those attracted to members of the
same sex, and bisexuals attracted to both sexes.
Maffei, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
194. See Maffei, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 395-96 ("Because Congress may have chosen not to
include the term 'sexual orientation' in Title VII does not mean that it has considered
and declined coverage to transsexuals.").
195. Maffei, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
196. Underwood v. Archer Management Servs. Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1994).
197. D.C. CoDEANN. § 1-2501 to 1-2557 (1992 & Supp. 1997).
198. See Underwood, 857 F. Supp. at 98 (noting incorrectly that "courts have firmly dis-
tinguished transsexuality from homosexuality").
199. In re Anonymous, 582 N.Y.S.2d 941, 942 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1992).
200. See Spanier, supra note 47, at 344 (finding evidence of societal biases against sexual
ambiguity in discourse related to cellular and subcellular biology).
201. See Shapiro, supra note 104, at 252; cf STEPHEN 0. MuRRAY, AMERICAN GAY 20,
250-51 (1996) (remarking on society's equation of homosexuality and effeminacy
and its rewarding of homosexuality made invisible by the absence of gender noncon-
formity); Case, supra note 129, at 54 (arguing that discrimination against effeminate
men may be overdetermined and effeminacy conflated with gayness).
202. Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
"Sex," "Gender, "and "Sexual Orientation "in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 Ca.
L. Rnv. 1, 122 (1995).
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whose anti-discrimination laws do not prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, make the same substitution with respect to
transsexuals and ultimately deny them, along with gays and lesbians,
legal protection from employment discrimination. In jurisdictions
that do include such prohibitions, transsexualism is said to be distinct
from sexual orientation. Thus, no matter the wording of the statutory
regime, transsexuals generally are not protected from employment dis-
crimination on either the basis of their transsexualism or of their
sexual orientation.M3
2. Claims Based on Sex
While courts have asserted with clarity that transsexuals may as-
sert discrimination claims based on their sex, ° as opposed to their
transsexualism, curious results obtain when they do. These results are
based in large measure on a conflation of the terms "biological,"
" anatomical," and "chromosomal," a misprision of the relationship
between the terms "sex" and "gender," and irrelevant attention to
transsexual plaintiffs' pasts and to the public's perception of their sex-
ual identities. When a transsexual sues for discrimination based on her
sex, courts exclude all claims but those alleging discrimination on the
basis of what sex the transsexual is perceived by others to be or, in the
alternative, was known by others to be in the past.2"' Needless to say,
203. But see EVANSTON, IL., ORDNmANca 61-0-97 (June 3, 1997) (defining sexual orien-
tation in Human Rights Ordinance as encompassing both affectional relationships
and gender identity); MINqNAPous, MINN., MUNIcIPAL CODE § 139.10, .20 (visited
Aug. 5, 1997) <http://www.municode.com/folio.pgi/11490.nfo/query=*/toc/
{@81}?> (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of affectional preference and in-
cluding within the definition of affectional preference "having or projecting a self-
image not associated with one's biological maleness or one's biological femaleness");
Conway v. City of Hartford, No. CV 950553003, 1997 WL 78585, at *7 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1997) (distinguishing between transsexualism and sexual orienta-
tion and allowing the sufficiently pleaded claim of discrimination based on sexual
orientation to proceed).
204. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977)
("M[Transsexuals claiming discrimination because of their sex, male or female, would
dearly state a cause of action under Title VII.").
205. See, e.g., James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 478, 481 (D. Kan.
1995) (granting summary judgment against an MTF who failed to allege discrimina-
tion against males); Dobre v. National R.R1 Passenger Corp. ("Amtrak"), 850 F.
Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that an MTF could not bring a claim for




transsexuals are unlikely to sue for discrimination based on a sex they
do not believe they are; the result is yet again that transsexuals cannot
advance viable claims under anti-discrimination laws.
a. Conflation
In certain cases, the conflation of the terms "biological,"
"anatomical," and "chromosomal," dooms transsexuals' claims of dis-
crimination. This phenomenon arises in actions brought both by
preoperative and by postoperative transsexuals. In such cases, the judi-
ciary does not disregard medical authority, but instead engages in a
selective use of it, ultimately applying its own rubric to determine the
sexual identity of transsexual plaintiffs.
In cases involving preoperative transsexuals, such as Sommers v.
Budget Marketing, Inc., the judiciary confuses the terms biology and
anatomy: "Plaintiff, for the purposes of Title VII, is male because she
is an anatomical male. This fact is not disputed. As the Court accepts
the biological fact as the basis for determining sex, the Court finds
that entry of summary judgment is appropriate.
Although the court in Sommers had itself engaged in a word sub-
stitution game, it nonetheless labeled Sommers's claim that she was
discriminated against "because of her status as a female ... that is, a
female with the anatomical body of a male"27 a "manipulation of se-
mantics.
"2°8
In cases involving postoperatives, the term "chromosomal" joins
the conflation. In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,2°  a postoperative
MTF pilot sued for sex discrimination. The Seventh Circuit, re-
sponding to the district court, which had reasoned that "'sex is not a
cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes,'"2 0 ruled that there was no
factual basis upon which to conclude that Ulane had been discrimi-
nated against because she was female,2 ' since her chromosomal
patterns had not been and could not be surgically altered, nor had the
206. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982) (quoting the
lower court's opinion).
207. Sommers, 667 F.2d at 749.
208. Id., at 749.
209. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
210. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084 (quoting the district court's opinion).
211. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087.
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surgery endowed her with a uterus or ovaries.2 ' Taking chromosomal
patterns as definitive of biology, the court described Ulane as "a bio-
logical male who takes female hormones, cross-dresses, and has
surgically altered parts of her body to make it appear to be female."
21 3
Moreover, in a singular aside, the court declared that "some in the
medical profession ... conclude that hormone treatments and sex re-
assignment surgery can alter the evident makeup of an individual, but
cannot change the individual's innate sex."214
Ulane is unhelpful for guiding the judiciary in determining how
much "more one than the other" a transsexual is. This is in part due
to the notable conflation in the opinion of the terms "chromosomes"
(referring to linear, DNA-containing bodies),2"5  "anatomical"
(referring to the structure of the organism) 2 1 ' and "biological"
(referring to an organism's vital processes), 2 7 and in part to the Ulane
212. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 nn.5-6.
213. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087. In the District of Columbia, it is possible Ulane could have
brought a daim for discrimination based on her personal appearance. See Underwood
v. Archer Management Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding the
daim of postoperative MTF who "retain[ed] some masculine traits" actionable under
the District of Columbia Hunian Rights Act) (quoting plaintiff Underwood's Com-
plaint); see aso Case, supra note 129, at 49 (advancing the view that "sex-specific
grooming standards violate Tide VII").
214. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 n.6 (emphasis added). Aside from the problem of defining
"innate sex," for which Webster's is uninformative, see WEBsT's, supra note 115, at
1073, it is significant that Sigmund Freud probably would not have been one of the
medical professionals to whom the court refers:
In both sexes organs have been formed which serve exclusively for the sex-
ual functions; they were probably developed from the same [innate]
disposition into two different forms. Besides this, in both sexes the other
organs, the bodily shapes and tissues, show the influence of the individual's
sex, but this is inconstant and its amount variable; these are what are
known as the secondary sexual characters. Science next tells you something
that runs counter to your expectations and is probably calculated to con-
fuse your feelings. It draws your attention to the fact that portions of the
male sexual apparatus also appear in the women's bodies, though in an at-
rophied state, and vice versa in the alternative case. It regards their
occurrence as indications of birexudity, as though an individual is not a
man or a woman but always both-merely a certain amount more the one
than the other.
Sigmund Freud, Femininity, in Naw INTRODucToRY LECTurEs ON PSYCHOANALYSIS
113-14 (James Strachey trans., 1965) (alteration and emphasis in original); see ako
BODY GuARDs, supra note 18, at 3 ("[B]iological sex is... labile, as its chromosomal,
gonadal, and secondary determinants may contest with each other,").
215. See WEBSrER'S, supra note 115, at 204.
216. See WEBSTER's, supra note 115, at 42.
217. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 115, at 115.
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court's conviction that Congress intended "sex" in Title VII to refer to
a plaintiff's biological sex.1 The court, in an oft-cited quote, con-
cluded that "sex, in its plain meaning' implies that it is unlawful to
discriminate against women because they are women and against men
because they are men, ""' returning the analysis to its premises in a
remarkable demonstration of circular reasoning.
b. Misprision
A misprision of the relation between "sex" and "gender"20 has
also scuttled numerous employment discrimination suits by transsexu-
als. In response to transsexuals' claims that since "sex" is synonymous
with "gender," Tide VII's discrimination prohibitions protect trans-
sexuals, 22' courts have concluded that Congress had only the
traditional notions of "sex" in mind when it enacted Title VII and
have thus found that "sex" is distinct from "gender." ,
2
The relation between "sex!' and "gender" has been the subject of
much recent scholarship. 22' Bernice L. Hausman marks the emergence
of the term "gender" as referring to the social and cultural distinctions
between the sexes in the appearance of a medical lexicon of the 1950s-• 224
which had as its object the treatment of intersex. In the 1960s Rich-
ard Green, M.D., defined gender as "the usually unshakable
conviction of being male or female." z25 Finally, the judiciary has de-
fined the relationship between "gender" and "sex": "The word
'gender' has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or
218. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087 ("We agree with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits that if
the term 'sex' as it is used in Tide VII is to mean more than biological male or bio-
logical female, the new definition must come from Congress.").
219. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
220. "mhe behavioral, cultural, or psychological traits typically associated with one sex."
WEBSTER'S, supra note 115, at 484.
221. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977).
222. See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662-63.
223. See, e.g., BoDY GuARDs, supra note 18; JuDrrH ButnER, BODiEs Ta4T MArrER: ON
THE DiscuRsrv lamus oF "Snx" (1993); GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 13;
LAQuBUR, supra note 123; Case, supra note 129; Katherine M. Franke, The Central
Mistake ofSex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation ofSex fom Gender, 144 U. PA.
L. Rnv. 1 (1995); Leslie Pearlman, Comment, Transsemalism as Metaphor: The Col-
lision ofSex and Gender, 43 BUFF. L REv. 835 (1995); Valdes, supra note 202.
224. See H.ousmAN, supra note 1, at 7-8.
225. Richard Green, Childhood Cross-Gender Identification, in TRNssExuAusM AND SEx
REASSiGNMENT 23, 26 (Richard Green & John Money eds., 1969).
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attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) dis-
tinctive to the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to
female and masculine to male."n'
While Justice Scalia's definition posits that sex is primary to gen-
227der, gender theorists have argued that gender is primary to sex.
Katherine Franke has noted that "[u]itimately, there is no principled
way to distinguish sex from gender," since in the employment dis-
crimination context, defining sex in biological or anatomical terms
fails to account for the degree to which most differences between men
and women are grounded not in biology, but in gender normativity.228
Judith Shapiro has suggested that the importance of disaggregating
gender and sex is to maintain the ideological operation of a fictively
stable sex/gender system. ' Linking the medical, judicial and theoreti-
cal viewpoints is the view that sex, socially and culturally constructed,
is gender. Given that Tide VII's remedial aspirations are aimed at a
societal, not a biological level, Tide VII is not aimed at sex at all, in
either its traditional or nontraditional sense, but is in fact aimed at
preventing irrelevant distinctions based on gender from being the ba-
sis of employment decisions. Current Tide VII jurisprudence supports
this point,"so with the differential treatment of masculine women and
226. SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. See, e.g., GENDER TRouBLE, supra note 13, at viii-ix (explaining that sex masquerades
as a primary condition, that it is in fact informed by gender, which only appears as
"new" and projects sex as its requisite antecedent); HAusMAN, supra note 1, at 177-
79 (examining gender as a product of the demand for a culturally coherent subjectiv-
ity and as subsumed by the category sex); LAQUEUR, supra note 123, at 62 (explaining
that, historically, differentiations of gender preceded differentiations of sex);
LAQUEUR, 5upra note 123, at 11 ("[A]lmost everything one wants to say about sex-
however sex is understood-already has in it a claim about gender."); Franke, supra
note 223, at 39 (theorizing that pre-given dimorphic concepts of gender lead to the
discovery of facts that differentiate the sexes); Patriarchy, Vupra note 37, at 1993 ("In
the transsexual's case, rather than biology's serving as the substance from which gen-
der attributes derive, anatomical sex follows from gender. Biological sex is revealed to
have no inevitable natural meaning, but only the social meaning attached to it on the
basis of gender identity.").
228. Franke, supra note 223, at 5.
229. See Shapiro, supra note 104, at 248.
230. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) ("'[iun forbid-
ding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes.'"" (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v.




effeminate men being only one example2' of the judiciary's focus, not
on chromosomes or genitalia, but on acceptable gender roles.
But courts have not discussed Tide VII this way. In Holloway, for
example, the court defined sex and gender and concluded that "sex" in
Tide VII does not mean gender. It supported its conclusion by
pointing again to the number of failed initiatives to amend Tide VII
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual preference and to a
Ninth Circuit opinion holding that Tide VII does not prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of homosexuality."a The Holloway court went
on to comment that "sex" should be given its traditional definition
based on the anatomical characteristics which divide organisms into
males and females. 3
In Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, the plaintiffs theory
that "because the legislature prohibited discrimination based on 'sex,'
rather than on 'male or female sex,' it left open the possibility of pro-
hibiting discrimination against persons with attributes of both sexes,"
was unpersuasive.B In a previous case, the district court accused
Sommers of engaging in semantic manipulation and granted the de-
fendant summary judgment.2s The substitution of "gender" for "sex"
in New York City's anti-discrimination regulation2" likewise suggests
a view that "sex" and "gender" are distinct.2 7
Not all courts, however, have taken such a narrow view. In MT.,
the court felt that sex and gender were synonymous:
Our departure from the Corbett thesis is not a matter of se-
mantics. It stems from a fundamentally different
understanding of what is meant by "sex" for marital purposes.
The English court apparently felt that sex and gender were
disparate phenomena. In a given case there may, of course, be
such a difference. A preoperative transsexual is an example of
that kind of disharmony, and most experts would be satisfied
that the individual should be classified according to biological
231. See Case, supra note 129, at 47 (noting that the exclusion of effeminate men from the
purview of Title VII's sex discrimination prohibitions is odd considering they exhibit
characteristics "associated with women, the subordinated group the statutory lan-
guage was principally designed to protect.").
232. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 n.6.
233. See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 ("Giving the statute its plain meaning, this court con-
cludes that Congress had only the traditional notions of 'sex' in mind.").
234. Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470,473-74 (Iowa 1983).
235. See Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982).
236. SeeNEwYo CnyADMiN. CODE, § 8-107 (1) (1996).
237. See Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391; 395 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
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criteria. The evidence and authority which we have examined,
however, show that a person's sex or sexuality embraces an in-
dividual's gender, that is, one's self-image, the deep
psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and char-
acter. Indeed, it has been observed that the "psychological sex
of an individual," while not serviceable for all purposes, is
"practical, realistic and humane."2 8
As noted above, however, MT. is an anomaly on the judicial
landscape."ss In making reference to semantics, however, it does recall
the courts' accusing transsexual plaintiffs of engaging in semantic
games in their formulation of potential Title VII claims. The disag-
gregation of' "sex" and "gender" achieved by courts in the
discrimination context is precisely such a semantic move, and it is ul-
timately meaningless and inappropriate in the Title VII context. This
disaggregation sends an unmistakable message of exclusion. Sex and
gender, whereas perhaps not one and the same for all purposes, in the
context of discrimination jurisprudence, have similar roles to play.
c. References to Pasts and Perceptions
The judiciary's semantic choices in transsexual discrimination
cases are not the only reason why transsexuals' discrimination claims
fail. The answer to the question "Is the gender of a given individual
that which society says it is, or is it, rather, that which the individual
claims it to be?" 20 is, as we have seen, that not only is a transsexual's
psychological sex irrelevant to courts hearing transsexuals' Title VII
238. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (quoting Douglas
K Smith, Comment, Transexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law, 56
CoaiNELL L. REv. 963, 969-70 (1971)).
239. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text. Several municipalities have included
"gender" or "gender identity" as specific prohibited bases for discrimination. See SAN
FRANcisco, CAL, ADMIN. CoDE §§ 12A.1, 12A.3 (1997) (including "gender iden-
tity" in antidiscrimination ordinance and defining it as "a person's various individual
attributes as they are understood to be masculine and/or feminine"); CAMBRUDGE
MASS., MUsq. CODE (1996) (visited Aug. 5, 1997) <http: //www.gendertalk.com/
GTransgr/cambh3.htm> (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender and de-
fining gender as "the actual or perceived appearance, expression, or identity of a
person with respect to masculinity and femininity"); PrrrsBuRGH, PA., MUN. Coon
(1997) (visited Nov. 7, 1997) <http:/Iwww.abmal.com/ictlep/> (defining sex as "the
gender of a person, as perceived, presumed or assumed by others, including those
who are changing or have changed their gender identification").
240. In reAnonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
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claims, but it is also fatal as the basis of a transsexual's sex discrimina-
tion claim. Further frustrating transsexual's claims are irrelevant
references to the public's perception of transsexuals' sexual identities
and to transsexual plaintiffs' past choices to undergo sex reassignment.
Ironically, these factors are probably in large measure why these claims
are made in the first instance; a transsexual who "passes" and whose
past identity and choice to undergo reassignment are unknown may
never face sex discrimination, and, if she does, the defense of trans-
sexualism may never occur to the defendants. Transsexuals who begin
sex reassignment while employed or whose past is known quickly dis-
cover that courts use these factors to reframe the issues presented and,
ultimately, to undercut the viability of their claims.
In Ulane, in response to the district court's opinion that sex is a
psychological question comprising considerations of self-perception
and perception by society, the court asserted that Ulane was entitled
to any personal belief about her sexual identity she desired and that "it
may be that society... considers Ulane to be female." 24' Such societal
perceptions were irrelevant, however, in light of the overriding fact
that Ulane had "surgically altered parts of her body to make it appear
to be female., 242 Thus, the court made clear, in its invocation of
Ulane's past, that although a transsexual could state a valid Title VII
cause of action on the basis of his or her reassigned sex, the discrimi-
nation could always be reframed as discrimination on the basis of
transsexuality, which, as we have noted, under Title VII is no claim at
all.
241. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
The court in "SRA" suggested that society may well perceive a postoperative
transsexual to be her reassigned sex because the common usage of terms such as "sex
change" and "sex conversion" "reflect[s] a perception that a male-to-female transsex-
ual who has had sex reassignment surgery may appropriately be described in ordinary
English as female." Secretary, Dep't of Soc. Sec. v. "SRA," No. NG745 of 1992,
FED No. 869/93, at 10 (Dec. 1, 1993).
242. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087. A variation on this theme appeared in Grossman v. Bernards
Township Ba of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302, *4 (D.NJ. Sept. 10, 1975),
affdah 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897 (1976), in which the
court concluded that although Grossman had become a woman by means of her sur-
gery, she was not terminated because she was a woman, but because she had changed
her sex. See aso Conway v. City of Hartford, No. CV 950553003, 1997 WL 78585,
at *6, *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1997) (accepting employer's characterization of
FTM's sexual harassment claim as "discrimination on the basis of change of sex rather
than sex" and concluding that Connecticut law "does not prohibit discrimination
against transsexuals").
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In Dobre v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. ('Amtrak), 2 ' the
plaintiff was hired as a man and began submitting to sex reassignment.
In a unique articulation of the basis for the discrimination, Dobre as-
serted that she was discriminated against because of her new gender
while in the process of transforming her body to conform with her
psychological sexual identity. The court fought its way past the issue
as framed by Dobre and determined that the claim could be action-
able only if defendant Amtrak considered Dobre to be female and
discriminated against her on that basis.2" Since Amtrak could rebut
any suggestion on Dobre's part that it perceived her to be female by
noting that Dobre was hired as a man, the court concluded that any
discrimination Dobre suffered was because she was perceived as a male
who wanted to become a female.4
Despite the judiciary's assurance that transsexuals have valid
claims under Title VII for discrimination on the basis of their reas-
signed sex, "the right to claim discrimination [is limited] to those who
were born into the victim class." 2 6 In Holloway, the court framed the
issue extremely narrowly: "whether an employee may be discharged,
consistent with Title VII, for initiating the process of sex transforma-
tion."2 47 The supposed narrowing of the issue in reality encompassed
preoperative, like Holloway, and postoperative transsexuals alike.
Moreover, what "initiating" the process referred to was ambiguous. In
dismissing Ulane's claim, the court made clear that the past could not
be discarded, no matter what interventions had taken place: "even if
one believes that a woman can be so easily created from what remains
of a man, that does not decide this case."24 8 In Holloway, the court also
noted that an official of the company was of the opinion that Hollo-
way "would be happier at a new job where her transsexualism would
243. Dobre v. Nat'l R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
244. See Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 287.
245. See Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 287. Similarly, in Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Commis-
sion, the plaintiff was hired while already undergoing sex reassignment, but was
discharged after being recognized by someone who had known her when Sommers
dressed as a man. See Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 471
(Iowa 1983)
246. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (Goodwin,
J., dissenting). See also James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 478, 481
(D. Kan. 1995) (granting summary judgment against an MTF who failed to allege
discrimination against males).
247. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
248. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087.
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be unknown." 24' The dissenting judge, responding to these irrelevant
considerations, made an appeal to common sense:
By its language, the statute proscribes discrimination among
employees because of their sex. When a transsexual completes
his or her transition from one sexual identity to another, that
person will have a sexual classification. Assuming that this
plaintiff has now undergone her planned surgery, she is, pre-
sumably, female, at least for most social purposes.50
Employment discrimination proscriptions in both the state and
city of New York, which have been interpreted more broadly than Ti-
tle VII,2 1 comport in large measure with this common sense
approach, with the result that transsexuals have had greater success
there in advancing their sex discrimination claims. Courts in New
York have found the federal cases "unduly restrictive" 252 in light of the
"overwhelming medical evidence" 21 that transsexuals become their
psychological sex once sex reassignment is complete. Shifting the em-
phasis from the fact of reassignment to reassignment's results, an
approach which would have resulted in an actionable sex discrimina-
tion claim for Karen Ulane, the court in Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry,
Inc., entertained a postoperative FTM's hostile work environment dis-
crimination claim. 24 The court concluded that a postoperative
transsexual assumes a different sex and can sue for sexual harassment
in the same way that non-transsexuals can when ridiculed for their
secondary sexual characteristics.25'
256
In Rentos v. Oce-Office Systems, another case brought under the
New York and the New York City equivalents of Title VII, a preop-
erative MTF's employment was terminated when she advised her
employer that she needed time off to undergo sex conversion surgery.
The court determined that Rentos had alleged a colorable claim of sex
discrimination under the state and city human rights laws.257 The
court noted that Rentos, in what could be termed a semantic coup,
249. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
250. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
251. See Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 394-396 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
252. Maffei, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
253. Id. at 395.
254. Maffei, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
255. See Maffei, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
256. Rentos v. Oce-Office Systems, No. CIV. 95-7908 LAP, 1996 WL 737215, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996).
257. See Rentos, 1996 WL737215, at*2.
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had assiduously tracked the language in Maffei, "quotation marks and
all," in framing the issues of her claim.258
Other jurisdictions show few signs of adopting these minority po-
sitions.259 For a multiplicity of reasons, sex discrimination claims
advanced by transsexuals are not cognizable. Although courts purport
to welcome such claims if transsexuals allege discrimination on the
basis of their anatomical sex prior to sex reassignment, preoperatives
and postoperatives are, in the main, psychologically incapable of do-
ing this.2'6 The realm of non-liability thus'created for employers is
total: under Dobre, employers who hire transsexuals prior to sex reas-
signment can easily claim that the employees were perceived to be
their anatomical sex; under Sommers, in the case of postoperatives, the
discovery of the fact of sex reassignment is enough to create dispositive
perceptions on the part of employers that the employee is in fact a
member of the opposite sex. The result curiously requires plaintiffs
not only to prove that they were perceived to be the sex upon the basis
of which they claim discrimination, but rests as well on the assump-
tion that discrimination never occurs unless the perpetrator actively
perceives the person to be the sex she wishes to discriminate against.
Perhaps the best, and as yet untested approach to these types of
claims, then, would be to advance transsexuals' discrimination claims
upon two theories, one for discrimination based on one sex, and an-
other for discrimination based on the other sex. The judiciary,
though, already gifted with an impressive track record of beating back
transsexuals' claims of employment discrimination via a discourse
scripted with semantic manipulation, may well already be endowed
with the rhetorical wherewithal to continue its campaign of exclusion
in response to this new strategy.
258. Rentos, 1996WL 737215, at *8.
259. There is some indication that the tide may be turning in the federal courts. See Miles
v. New York Univ., No. 94 CIV. 8685 WK, 1997 WL 626891, *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
7, 1997) (allowing Title IX sexual harassment claim to proceed where MTF, though
undergoing sex reassignment during tenure in academic program, was perceived as
female).
260. See Franke, supra note 223, at 35 ("According to the traditional view, the sexed
body-one's inside-is immutable, whereas gender identity--one's outside--is mu-
table. Yet for the transgendered person, the sexed body-one's outside-is regarded
as mutable while one's gendered identity-one's inside--is experienced as immuta-
ble."). But see Karen T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 781 (Fam. Ct. 1985)
(FTM postoperative asserted his chromosomal sexual identity enabling him to dis-
claim responsibility for providing child support for his adopted children, since under
the law he could not be the father of the children by virtue of being female).
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F Changes ofName and Gender Marker on Birth Certificates
While categorization as one sex or another and exclusion from
society constitute coercive forces over which transsexuals ultimately
have little control, recognition of a name befitting their psychological
sexual identity is a privilege the judiciary is willing to grant, albeit
with caution and a caveat. At common law "an individual [could] as-
sume any name, absent fraud, or an interference with the rights of
others."26' The change required no judicial approval and was accom-
plished merely by using the new name. 62 Although the common law
rule still applies in most jurisdictions, many states have in addition
adopted statutory schemes providing for judicial oversight of changes
of name. These court-approved name changes receive an "aura of pro-
priety and official sanction," in that the proceeding is memorialized
by the issuance of the Court's order.263 In such proceedings, the court
evaluates the potential of the new name to deceive or defraud soci-
264ety.
Given the foregoing, postoperative transsexuals may obtain
changes of name;265 preoperatives may as well, if they can produce
proof of their transsexuality and will not use the change of name to
claim that their sex reassignment is complete.2" In general, however, a
transsexual, whether pre- or postoperative, has no right to an altera-
tion of the gender marker on her birth certificate,2 7 and courts even
question their authority to grant such a request.268 Cases in this area
261. In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
262. See In re Anonymous, 587 N.Y.S.2d 548, 548 (Civ. Ct. 1992); In re Anonymous,
582 N.Y.S.2d 941, 941 (Civ. Ct. 1992).
263. Anonymous, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
264. SeeAnonymous, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
265. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
266. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Civ. Ct. 1970). But for cases holding
that a change of name is not permitted until sex reassignment surgery, see In re Rich-
ardson, 23 Pa. D. & C.3d 199 (1982); In re Dowdrick, 4 Pa. D. & C.3d 681
(1978); In re Dickinson, 4 Pa. D. & C.3d 678 (1978).
267. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ArNN. § 68-3-203(d) (1996) ("The sex of an individual will not
be changed on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.").
268. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101-02 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
(demonstrating little concern for the possibility of fraud but nonetheless concluding
that Department of Health's refusal to change sex designation on birth certificate was
reasonable given "ambiguity" of transsexuals' sex); Hartin v. Director of the Bureau
of Records and Statistics, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (Sup. Ct. 1973) ("[T]he power of
regulating birth certificates lies solely within the jurisdiction of the Board of Health.
... ); Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 835 (mentioning a civil court has no jurisdiction
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reflect a concern that society not be defrauded by an avoidable misap-
prehension of an individual's sex.
In Anonymous v. Weiner,29 a New York court refused a postop-
erative MTF an order for a change of the sex designated on her birth
certificate from "male" to "female." In a curious amalgam of deference
to medical authority and a concern for societal perceptions of trans-
sexual persons, the court referred to a statement of the New York
Academy of Medicine, which, assuming a juridical stance, concluded
"the desire of concealment of a change of sex by the transsexual is
outweighed by the public interest for protection against fraud."270 The
Academy's preoccupation with fraud, then, focused on the transsex-
ual's state of mind and not on her outward appearance or successful
reassignment. Nor was it, oddly, tied to the idea that birth certificates
are public records announcing facts as they were observed at a par-
ticular point in time.27'
to order alteration of a birth certificate); Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319,
323 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (deferring to Board of Health where "the nature of the problem
posed ... requires a specialized training and skill for which the Board is uniquely
equipped"); K. v. Health Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 560 P.2d 1070, 1072
(Or. 1977) (commenting that the legislature should decide whether transsexuals may
obtain new birth certificates upon completion of sex reassignment), rev' 552 P.2d
840 (Or. Ct. App. 1976); Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5
(1990). But see Amuz. RV. STAT. § 36-326(A)(4) (1993); CAI. HaLH & SAFETY
CODE § 103430 (West 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-217(d) (1981); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 31-10-23(e) (1996); HAW. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 338-17.7(a)(4)(B) (Mitchie 1996);
IOWA CODE § 144.23(3) (1994); L. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 40:62(A) (West 1992);
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 46, § 13 (Law Co-op. 1993); MIcH. Comp. Laws.
§333.2831(c) (1978); NEB. Ra,. STAT. §71-604.01 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:8-40.12 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §24-14-25(D) (Mitchie 1978); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 130A-118(b)(4) (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. §26-2-11 (1995); VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-269(E) (Mitchie 1997); Wis. STAT. Arm. § 69.154(4)(B) (West
1993); 10 GuoA CODE ANN. §3222(e) (1995) (all expressly permitting either
amendment or reissuance of birth certificate where sex reassignment surgery has been
performed and, in some states, a change of name has been obtained), Florida and
Texas remain vague with respect to whether this procedure is possible. Florida's stat-
ute refers to correcting "misstatements, errors, or omissions occurring in the birth
record." FL STAT. § 382.016 (1995). Texas' statute applies "to complete or correct
a record that is incomplete or proved by satisfactory evidence to be inaccurate." TEx.
STAT. § 191.028(b) (1988). See also Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(set A) at 12 (1980) (European Commission on Human Rights case advancing the
view that a violation of Article 8 occurs when a state signatory refuses to rectify sex
recorded in the civil status of a female who became a male).
269. Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1966);
270. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
271. See Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) 5 (1990) ("An entry in a
birth register and the certificate derived therefrom are records of facts at the time of
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In In re Anonymous,2 a postoperative MTF successfully sought a
change of name from an obviously male name to an obviously female
name. The court based its ruling, after a lengthy discussion of sex reas-
signment surgery, on the applicant's sexual capacities. Finding "'her'
physiological orientation ... complete," the court noted the peti-
tioner's incapacity ever again to function as a male either procreatively
or sexually and her capability of having sexual relations as a woman."'
But beyond this focus on sexual capacity was something more: the
petitioner was "impossible to distinguish ... from any other fe-
male."274 Thus, the possibility of fraud, thought by the Academy of
Medicine to be inherent in the transsexual's desire to hide the fact of
sex reassignment, actually lay on the other side:
It would seem to this court that the probability of so-called
fraud, if any, exists to a much greater extent when the birth
certificate is permitted, without annotations of any type, to
classify this individual as a "male" when, in fact, as aforesaid,
the individual comports himself as a "female."27
Thus, the change of name cases, seemingly attempting to address
the concerns of transsexual self-actualization and participation in soci-
ety, are in fact focused on the potential of transsexuals to create
societal unrest and general disruption. Given that a postoperative who
is indistinguishable from any female is unlikely to create such distur-• 276
bances, a change of name is appropriate.
birth."); ef K, 560 P.2d at 1072 (deferring to the legislature, but commenting that
the view that a birth certificate is an historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time, of birth is equally as plausible as the view that birth certificates are records of
facts as they currently exist).
272. In reAnonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
273. Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
274. Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
275. Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
276. But see Franke, supra note 223, at 61 n.255 (explaining that the desire to see and
interpret difference is "'fueled by a desire to tell the difference, to guard against a dif-
ference that might otherwise put the identity of one's own position in question.' ")
(quoting MAsjouaE GARBER, VESTED INtRsrs: CRoss DaRssING & CULTURAL
AsvaN- 130 (1992)). Franke further explains:
In these cases, the power to name is delegated to a medical or administra-
tive authority- so long as that agent acts according to the rules governing
his or her office, a court will not second guess that designation or allow the
individual so labeled to do so.... Once the body is read, two things hap-
pen: text is subordinated to interpretation, and later re-readings are not
permitted-narrative time suddenly stops. As such, the birth attendant's
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Focus on the transsexual applicant's sexual capacities and out-
ward appearance led the court to grant a request for a change of name
to a preoperative MTF in In re Anonymous.2n In that case, the trans-
sexual had undergone medical treatment, albeit not genital surgery,
which had made her appear female and which had rendered her
"unable to engage in male procreative activities. " 7 The court applied
a visual inspection test, granted the request, and expressly forbade the
applicant from relying on the order as evidence that she was no longer
anatomically male-the implication being that such a use of the order
would constitute fraud.2 9
The court appeared to overlook the possibility that the appli-
cant's feminine appearance and male sexual incapacity could
potentially be reversed by the cessation of her preoperative regimen.
This possibility was vigorously pursued in two 1992 cases,280 in which
the criteria for evaluating the permissibility of a name change became
proof of the applicant's transsexualism and of the irreversibility and
completely permanent nature of her decision to live as a female. 28' The
court held that the applicant had failed to make an adequate showing,
via medical and psychiatric evidence, as to whether she was a trans-
vestite or a transsexual and, if a transsexual, whether she had
undergone a sex change operation.2Z "[W]ithout such supportive evi-
dence," stated the court, "the change of name from a 'male' name to a
'female' name would be fraught with danger of deception and confu-
sion and contrary to the public interest. 283 Public perception and an
appeal to medical authority again merged as the court explained why
it could not issue the order:
The Court's controlling responsibility is to insure against the
possibility that its Order will lend legal credence to confusing
or misleading the public in its dealings with the petitioner.
Without a competent medical and psychiatric evaluation of
declaration of the baby's sex is performative rather than descriptive, creat-
ing rather than describing the child's sex.
Franke, supra note 223, at 53.
277. In reAnonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Civ. Ct. 1970).
278. Anonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 669.
279. SeeAnonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 668-70.
280. See In re Application of Anonymous, 587 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Civ. Ct. 1992); In re
I Anonymous, 582 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Civ. Ct. 1992).
281. SeeApplication ofAnonymous, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
282. SeeApplication ofAnonymous, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
283. Application ofAnonymous, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
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the petitioner, granting the relief requested may be contrary to
the public interest as well as harmful to petitioner's present
284mental status.
In In re Eck,285 a preoperative MTF medically classified as a trans-
sexual, who had assumed the appearance of a woman for many years,
and who was undergoing hormone therapy in preparation for sex reas-
signment surgery, requested a change of name. Remarking that "it is
inherently fraudulent for a person who is physically a male to assume
an obviously 'female' name for the sole purpose of representing him-
self to future employers and society as a female,"28" the trial court
denied the request. The appellate court reversed, finding no inherent
fraud in the choice of an obviously "female" name:
[We perceive that the judge was concerned about a male as-
suming a female identity in mannerism and dress. That is an
accomplished fact in this case, a matter which is of no concern
to the judiciarTy and which has no bearing upon the outcome
of a simple name change application.2s'
In contrast to the cases discussed above, no mention was made in In re
Eck of the possibility that the applicant would use the order as evi-
dence that her anatomical sex had in fact been changed.
In seeming contrast to the cases excluding transsexuals from par-
ticipation in society, the change of name cases appear at first blush to
indicate a solicitude on the part of the courts to help transsexuals find
their way along the sexual continuum to a place within the legal
scheme of binary sex classification and thus within society at large. In
this way, the change of name cases may remind one of cases discussing
the medical necessity of sex reassignment surgery and the availability
of public funds to allow indigent transsexuals to pay for such surgery.
Any resemblance between the two groups of cases, however, is purely
superficial. Naming the grotesque body is permissible, not because of
any relief it affords the person, named, but because, ultimately, the
284. Anonymous, 582 N.Y.S. 2d at 942. The aftermath of the case was In re Rivera, 627
N.Y.S.2d 241 (Civ. Ct. 1995), in which the same preoperative petitioned again, this
time submitting medical and psychiatric affidavits attesting to her transsexualism.
The court granted the petition, following In re Anonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Civ.
Ct. 1970), and admonished the applicant not to use the name as any evidence that
she was no longer anatomically male.
285. In re Eck, 584 A.2d 859 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
286. Eck, 584 A.2d at 860.
287. Eck, 584 A.2d at 861.
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name masks the grotesque by removing from view the potentially ex-
plosive discontinuity between the name and the named. Thus, naming
in these cases is not performed for the benefit of the transsexual, but
for the benefit of the world around her. In this way, the courts posi-
tion the grotesque body as "recuperative, a sort of safety valve in the
service of dominant ideology,"8 ignoring the extent to which the
transsexual body is nonetheless "subversive, that which exceeds and
refuses that ideology."2"
The change of name cases reveal that the dominant ideology is
better served by allowing name changes, especially in cases where the
transsexual "passes." Since transsexuals cannot be segregated from so-
ciety, quarantined as it were, some accommodation must be made for
the sake of public order.2' The results of the visual inspection test in
the change of name cases relieves the concern about fraud via the rec-
ognition that society is less disrupted by allowing the change. Once a
transsexual has begun a departure from one sexual category, courts
attempt to speed him or her to the new category so as to prevent so-
cietal disequilibrium, 2 ' bypassing the category of nonpersons
currently occupied by hermaphrodites. 92
The same benefit is not present in the change of birth certificate
cases. In these cases, the courts are more preoccupied with anatomy
than with appearance, a focus which explains why some states allow a
change of the birth certificate, but only where some sort of surgical
intervention has taken place. This is precisely what distinguishes such
288. BODY GUARDs, supra note 18, at 9.
289. BODY GuARDs, supra note 18, at 9.
290. See, for example, the discussion of changes of name for transsexuals, supra notes 261-
287, and accompanying text.
291. "ITihe limbo of no finality in [transsexuals'] documents without genital surgery is
incredibly onerous." Correspondence with Phyllis Randolph Frye, June 7, 1997 (on
file with author).
292. See Ann Rosalind Jones & Peter Stallybrass, Fetishizing Gender: Constructing the
Hermaphrodite in Renaissance Europe, in BODY GUARDs, Supra note 18. Jones and
Stallybrass discuss the position of hermaphrodites:
There have been two dominant trends in the analysis of [the hermaphro-
dite]. In the first, the hermaphrodite is read as the problem which a binary
logic attempts to erase. In this reading, androgyny is the necessary irritant
in the production and stabilization of a systematic division of gender. In
the second, the hermaphrodite is understood as the vanishing point of all
binary logics, a figure which embodies the dissolution of male and female
as absolute categories.
Jones & Stallybrass, supra at 80.
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cases from transvestism where no accommodation is made, since no
bodily alterations take place.293
What, then, explains certain courts' willingness to alter the gen-
der marker on the birth certificates of transsexuals who have not
undergone sex reassignment surgery?2' In these rare cases courts rec-
ognize, just as they do in the change of name cases, that "transsexual
and transgender males can live as women and females can live as men
with or without surgery."29' But in the change of name cases, focus is
placed on presentation, while with respect to birth certificates, the fo-
cus is placed on the state of the body.
These rare cases, however, are consistent with that focus on the
body since in them lies the recognition that hormone therapy, even
absent sex reassignment surgery, can permanently alter the contours of
the body. For example, for MTFs, estrogen therapy, designed to
achieve partial castration and hormonal feminization, if pursued long-
term, achieves the lasting effects of testicular atrophy, gynecomastia,
and reduction in size of the penis to the point of its resembling a hy-
perextended clitoris.296 Similarly, for FTMs the vocal cords are
permanently thickened, the muscles increase in size, and the clitoris
develops into what resembles a small penis. 297 Reversal of these trans-
formations is often not possible absent surgical intervention.298 For an
MTF, a mastectomy may be necessary; for an FTM, facial hair can
only be removed by electrolysis and breast augmentation is required.299
In short, the effects of hormone therapy cannot be reversed in the
sense that in terminating hormone therapy the transsexual returns to
his or her prior state. Thus the test in cases where pre-operative
293. See Patriarchy, supra note 37, at 1990-93.
294. Phyllis Randolph Frye, Executive Director of the International Conference on Trans-
gender Law and Employment Policy, pioneered the procedure of changing the gender
marker on birth certificates prior to sex reassignment surgery. See Louis H. Swartz,
Legal Responses to Transexalhm: Scientific Logic Versus Compassionate Flexibility in
the U.S. and the U.K, IV PROCEEDINGS FROM THE FouRT INT'L CONFERENCE ON
TRANSGENDER LAw ND Em. Ommtr Poucy A-1-16 (1995); Phyllis Randolph
Frye, Freedom From the Have-To of the Scalpel, in PROCEEDINGS FROM THE FFm
INT'L CONFERENCE ON TRANSGENDER LAw AND EMPLOYmENT Poucy, July 1996, at
29-38 [hereinafter Scalpel].
295. MAcKENzm, supra note 1, at 1.
296. See Phyllis Randolph Frye, Non-Operative TS: Clitoral Hypertrophy, in PROCEED-
INGS FROM THE SECOND INT'L CONFERENCE ON TRANSGENDER LAW AND
EMLoYmENT Poc,, Aug. 1993, at 108.
297. See Scalpel supra note 294, at 35.
298. See Scalpel, supra note 294, at 38.
299. Correspondence with Phyllis Randolph Frye, June 23, 1997 (on file with author).
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transsexuals are able to obtain alterations of their birth certificates is
not one of visual inspection at all, as in the change of name cases, but
is one recognizing that the road "back" from irreversible hormone
therapy is "very arduous and not taken lightly.""' Faced with irre-
versible hormonal alterations, some courts are unprepared to deny
transsexuals a gender marker which reflects the transformation of their
bodies via hormone therapy.3 '
CONCLUSION
The divergence of the legal outcomes faced by transsexuals lies, at
least in part, in the different approaches the medical and legal estab-.
lishments take toward transsexuals. Though law and medicine agree
on the medical necessity of sex reassignment surgery for transsexuals,
300. Correspondence with Phyllis Randolph Frye, June 23, 1997 (on file with author).
301. These procedures raise the question whether recognition of a transsexual's "new" sex
on official documents will permit marriage when the fact of sex reassignment is
known. The question has not been litigated, but some feel that recognizing such un-
ions would be tantamount to permitting same-sex marriages, forbidden at present in
all states. See Arriola, supra note 96, at 22 n.79. The opposite view has also been ad-
vanced. See Catherine Kunkel Watson, Note, Transsexual Marriages: Are They Valid
Unde California Law?, 16 Sw. U. L REv. 505, 529 (1986) (where a statute permits
alterations to birth certificates for post-operative transsexuals, and where procedural
requirements guard against fraud, '[tlo argue that the legislature intended to deny the
transsexual the right to marry or that such denial of a fundamental right would serve
an important state interest in these circumstances would require an absurd straining
of logic.").
In a case pending'in California, a postoperative FTM with a constructed penis,
testicles and "a range of sexual function" is being sued for divorce and sole custody of
the couple's child conceived by donor insemination. The wife's argument is that
FTMs are chromosomally female and that therefore the marriage is null, "since Cali-
fornia law prohibits same-sex marriage." See Jeanne McDowell, What are Dads Made
of A Calforia Child-Custody Case May Hinge on the Fathers Gender-He Used to Be
a Woman, TIME, July 7, 1997, at 36. The FTM in this case was incapable of obtain-
ing a birth certificate modification under Cal. Stat. § 103430, because she was born
in New York, but the court, responding to the wife's motion for summary judgment,
determined that California would recognize the husband's male sex nonetheless, See
Interview with Shannon Minter, National Center for Lesbian Rights (Nov. 25, 1997)
(on file with author). In Colorado, Governor Romer vetoed a prohibition on same-
sex marriage bill after Dianna L Cicotello, an MTF who underwent sex reassignment
after marrying a woman, testified before a legislative committee that the proposed law
would nullify her marriage and that of others similarly situated. See John Sanko,
Romer Vetoes Gay Wedding Ban; Governor Sees Measure as Threat to Common Law
Marriages in State, RocK MTN. NEws, June 6, 1997, at 4A; John Sanko, Senate
Panel Approves Bill to Ban Gay Marriages; Bill Supporters Accused ofPandering to Right
Wing, Rocc MTN. NEws, March 5, 1997, at 9A.
[Vol. 4:275
TRANSSEXUALISM
they differ on who the transsexual becomes post-surgery. 02 While the
medical establishment sees disorder before sex reassignment, the legal
establishment continues to see disorder after reassignment. The differ-
ence may lie simply in the fact that the medical establishment
considers psychological criteria in the determination of sex, while the
legal establishment is not so prone. The resulting focus on congruence
of selected sexual indicia finds medicine in a position opposite to that
of law, which views postoperative transsexuals as incongruent individu-
als whose freedoms should be curtailed. Legally the transsexual is kept in
a state of limbo, able to obtain sex reassignment surgery, except while in
prison, sometimes able to change her name, but unable to marry, un-
able to sue for employment discrimination, and, for MTFs, incapable
of maintaining parental rights. In the prison context, where freedoms
taken for granted on the outside are routinely curtailed, not only may
transsexuals be denied estrogen, they may be compelled to seek the
protection of administrative segregation. In all these ways, the legal sys-
tem defines the transsexual body and its place in the world as decidedly
other and unworthy of participation in societal institutions.
An examination of why courts take unfavorable positions towards
transsexuals reveals what lies behind these outcomes. Working within
a paradigm positing a rigid view of mutually exclusive sexes, the courts
are incapable of coping with the medical proposition that sex operates
along a continuum. In the view of the courts, the transsexual body is
not "finished;" its duality lies in its refusal to be male or female. This
is perhaps understandable in the case of a preoperative transsexual un-
dergoing a regimen of feminizing or masculinizing hormones and
engaging in cross-dressing. Regarding the postoperative, the courts
betray a preoccupation with what is missing from the body. To the
courts, both bodies are grotesque by virtue of their subversion of
traditional sexual categories and definitions.03 Faced with these
302. But see HAusmxtN, supra note 1, at 193 ("To advocate th[e] use [of sex reassignment]
one must accede to the facticity of gender and its status as the master signifier of sex.
In other words, one must believe in the simulation as real.").
303. Richard Weisberg has noted the ability of a legal discourse of the grotesque to chal-
lenge and undo a discourse of exclusion. See Richard Weisburg, The Hermeneutic of
Acceptance and the Discourse of the Grotesque, With a Classroom Exercise on Vichy Law,
17 CAinozo L REv. 1875, 1876 (1996) (examining judicial responses to antebellum
slave laws and anti-Jewish laws in Vichy France). I do not (yet) see the deployment of
a discourse of the grotesque in response to persecution in the context of transsexual-
ism, as does Weisberg in the context of the antebellum South and Vichy France, but
rather a dassical response which sees transsexualism as grotesque and problematizes
its existence through a system of binary sexual coding.
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uncertainties, the law is unprepared to confront the crossing over of
boundaries presented by the phenomenon of transsexualism. This may
in fact be one reason why the transsexual's "new" sex is so often de-
nied legal recognition.
Yet, explaining judicial rejection of the transsexual body by
pointing to the classical underpinnings of the legal system is ulti-
mately unsatisfactory, leaving nagging questions in its wake. Certainly
the very idea that one sex can change into another challenges the
imagination, but the disproportion between the degree to which trans-
sexuals challenge the sexual order adhered to by the law and the
degree to which they are systematically denied basic rights as result of
that challenge suggests that the explanation for this state of affairs is
more than mere judicial disapproval. The explanation may well lie
more buried. The theories of Bakhtin, Freud and Barthes bring to
light that the ridicule and horror engendered by transsexuals lies in
their ability to explode settled social expectations and to destabilize
the very social framework within which the law moves.
Such deeply rooted aversion to the presumed threat transsexuals
pose to the social order seems almost insurmountable. Overcoming
this aversion may only be achieved through small strides toward as-
suring that transsexuals eventually are allowed, particularly by the
courts, to claim their true sexual identity. A nascent jurisprudence of
transsexualism imbued with the courage to accept that sexual identity
lies along a continuum and with a view toward reworking societal in-
stitutions for the good of all can be the first step. t
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